III. Problems of Turkey and Azerbaijan with Armenia
The
Karabakh Problem
Ömer Engin LÜTEM*
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This essay will include a brief history of the Karabakh problem which
constitutes the most important conflict in the South Caucasus and analyze
the invasion by Armenian forces of Azerbaijani territories, international
efforts directed at the solution of the problem, the main resolutions
adopted by international organizations on this issue and the benefits
regional countries stand to gain from the settlement of the conflict.
Karabakh and Mountainous Karabakh are two different geographical terms.
Karabakh is the approximately 18.000 km2-sized area between the Kura and
Arax rivers of Azerbaijan and Lake Sevan (Gökçe Gölü) of Armenia. Of this
region 4300 km2 is mountainous and commands strategic value. This region has
been called Nagorny (mountainous) Karabakh by the Russians and constitutes
today the point of conflict between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians. This
area is now called Karabakh only, mainly because of practical reasons.
The Russian Empire, primarily due to geo-strategic concerns, created the
Karabakh problem approximately two centuries ago. At the outset of the 19th
century, Turkic peoples and especially Azerbaijanis were in the majority and
Armenians constituted a minority in the regions that are modern day Karabakh
and Armenia. The majority of the Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire and
Iran. Karabakh, which in the Turkish language means black garden or black
vineyard, was a Khanate composed mainly of Azerbaijanis.
After gaining control of the Caucasus, the Russian Empire followed a policy
of increasing the Armenian population in the region, as it was convinced
that this would make administering the area easier [1]. With this aim, the
Russian Empire especially tried to move to the Caucasus those Armenians
living in Iran and the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire. Parallel to this
development, a part of the Muslim population of Karabakh migrated to the
other regions of Azerbaijan and to Ottoman territories. The Russian policy
of moving Armenians to the Caucasus was successful in eventually changing
the ethnic composition in the area and particularly in Karabakh. While the
Armenians continued to move to the Southern Caucasus throughout the 19th
century, with the exception of some areas, they did not become a majority in
many regions. However the flow of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia to the
Caucasus after the Balkan Wars and the migration of approximately 420.000
Armenians [2] to the region during and following World War I led to
Armenians forming a majority in the regions that modern day Armenia is
comprised of.
The Russian policy of moving Armenians to the Caucasus yielded the following
results: the increase of Armenians in the Caucasus made it difficult for the
Moslem peoples in the region to unite against the invading Russian forces
and prevented them from cooperating against the Russians with Iran and the
Ottoman Empire - the two Moslem powers in the region. The Armenians under
Russian control played an important role in the revolt of the Ottoman
Armenians and the propagation of the idea of an independent Armenia. It was
under the same influence that the Ottoman Armenians sided with the Russian
army in the First World War. On the other hand, settling Armenians in
Karabakh also led to a serious conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia that
occasionally escalated into armed conflict.
With the collapse of the Russian Empire an Armenian state was created in the
Caucasus in 1918. The Sèvres treaty, which essentially liquidated the
Ottoman Empire, granted to the Armenians vast territories in East Anatolia.
The Armenians initiated a war to take possession of the said territories but
were defeated by the Turkish forces and accepted the boundaries in force
today. Soon after Armenia ceased to exist as an independent state and joined
the Soviet Union.
After all of the Caucasus came under Soviet control, the Mountainous
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (region) was created and attached to Azerbaijan.
According to Armenian sources [3] this region with an overwhelmingly
Armenian population was attached to Azerbaijan because the Soviets were
practicing the policy of “divide and rule.” Stalin, who as a native of
Georgia knew the conditions in the Caucasus very well drafted the following
map: Nakhichevan is separated from Azerbaijan through an Armenian corridor.
Thus Azerbaijan loses direct contact with one of her important provinces.
Furthermore, Turkey is prevented from becoming a neighbor of Azerbaijan.
Karabakh is attached to Azerbaijan, thereby creating a source of continuous
discontent between Azerbaijan and Armenia, forcing the two parties to resort
to the mediation of Moscow.
During the Stalin era occasional demands of Karabakh being attached to
Armenia were met with harsh reactions from Moscow. For instance, it has been
claimed that one of the reasons for the assassination in 1936 of Khanjian,
the First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, can be traced back to
the Karabakh problem [4]. After the Second World War the USSR demanded from
Turkey not only control of the Turkish Straits but also the provinces of
Kars and Ardahan and simultaneously it called on the Armenians of the
diaspora to settle in Armenia, thereby further strengthening the existing
nationalism in Armenia. However the Soviets tried hard to allow this
nationalism to be aimed abroad only (in other words towards Turkey) while
attempting to keep the same sentiment from impacting on national problems
such as Karabakh.
The Karabakh problem could only reemerge in the atmosphere of relative
freedom that followed the death of Stalin. At this time some personalities
from Karabakh applied to Moscow on numerous occasions and demanded that the
area be joined with Azerbaijan. Clashes that erupted in 1988 between
Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Khankendi, the capital of the region that was
now known as Stepanakert showed that there was a strong tendency in Karabakh
for joining Armenia. It also appears that this tendency was being covertly
supported by Armenia. The Armenian diaspora which always pursued dreams of
creating a greater Armenia also wanted to see Karabakh being a part of
Armenia. Moscow disregarded these requests, which if granted, would upset
the existing order. In 1973 Boris Kevorkov became head of the Karabakh
Communist Party and while serving in that capacity maintained the status quo
as demanded by Moscow. During this 15 year period, those asking to join
Armenia were accused of engaging in Dashnak propaganda.
Mikhail Gorbachev became Secretary General of the Communist party in 1985
and tried to implement the much needed reforms that the conservative party
cadres had been preventing. Gorbachev demanded these reforms to be founded
on certain basic principles such as restructuring (perestroyka), openness
(glasnost), democratization (demokratizatzia) and new thinking (novoe
mysshlenia). Thus an era of relative liberalization started in the USSR,
causing long unvoiced complaints to surface and nationalistic sentiments to
gain strength. Strong nationalistic currents emerged quickly in Armenia and
Karabakh, demands that Karabakh be annexed to Armenia were made and street
protests organized.
A serious crisis erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia when the latter
supported the demands of Karabakh. As the USSR was breaking up, it could not
be decisive enough to overcome the crisis. Soon after these developments it
became more concerned with trying to preserve its presence in the region and
to that end implemented policies that often supported Armenia but sometimes
Azerbaijan as well. The USA and European powers had no real influence in the
region at that time. While stating that they supported peace initiatives, on
overall they followed a policy of non-involvement. This created a very
conducive conjecture for Armenia.
In February 1988 protests were being held in Karabakh and in Armenia. The
Karabakh Parliament (110 of the 140 members were Armenian) decided on
February 18, 1988 that the region should be annexed to Armenia. However the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR rejected this decision
citing that this would be harmful to relations between nationalities and
that it was a product of the provocation of national extremists. In the
meantime the protests had grown and 100.000 persons had gathered in the
Opera Square in Yerevan on February 22. The protests only stopped after
Gorbachev delivered a calming speech on February 26 and agreed to meet with
representatives of the “Committee for Karabakh” that had been elected in
Yerevan. However, clashes erupted between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Baku
and Sumgait when Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were attacked and had to
flee. The clashes in Sumgait on 28-29 February resulted in the deaths of 26
Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis. 197 were wounded [5].
Despite the ban, protests continued and on March 12, 1988 the Karabakh
Parliament passed another resolution renewing the demand to be annexed to
Armenia. On May 21,1988 the First Secretaries of the Azerbaijani and
Armenian Communist Parties, Bagiraov and Demirchyan respectively, were
relieved of their duties by Moscow, ostensibly for health reasons. Suren
Haroutunian in Armenia and Abdul Rakhman Vezirov in Azerbaijan replaced them
[6].
On June 15 the Armenian Parliament decided to request from the Azerbaijani
Parliament and the Supreme Soviet that Karabakh be incorporated into
Armenia. This decision was based on Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution
which stated that the USSR was an integral, federal, multinational state
formed on the principle of the right to self-determination of nations and
voluntary associations of equal Soviets. On the other hand the Azerbaijani
Parliament decided on June 17 that the decision of the Armenian Parliament
was null and void, based on Article 78 of the Soviet Constitution which
stated that the territory of a Union Republic could not be altered without
its consent. From a purely legalistic point of view, it is clear that the
region of Karabakh, which is not a Soviet Republic, could not resort to the
provisions of Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution.
After the Parliament of Armenia, on July 12, 1988 the Parliament of Karabakh
also demanded immediate secession from Azerbaijan and incorporation into
Armenia as an autonomous Oblast to be known by its ancient name Artsakh [7].
On July 18, this was discussed in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
and the demand was rejected. This decision prompted large protests and
strikes in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Moscow, considering the inability or unwillingness of the local
administrators of Armenia and Azerbaijan in resolving the Karabakh issue,
established the “Special Administrative Committee for Nagorny Karabakh” and
appointed Arkady Volsky of the USSR Communist Party Central Committee as its
chairman.
On November 24, 1988 a state of emergency was declared in Azerbaijan in
Ganja (then known as Kirovabad) and Nakhichevan. Three days later the party
leaders of the said town and region were dismissed. Troops began evacuating
Armenians from these regions. In the weeks following this event tens of
thousands of Azerbaijanis fled Armenia and a similar amount of Armenians
fled Azerbaijan. According to statements made in Moscow, 87 died in the
incidents and 1500 were wounded. 158.000 Armenians fled Azerbaijan while
141.000 Azerbaijanis fled Armenia and 15.855 weapons were seized [8].
On December 7, 1988 an earthquake struck Armenia and caused the death of
close to 25.000 persons. Even this tragic incident did not stall the
protests in Armenia. In a television address on December 11, Gorbachev
denounced those that were trying to exploit the earthquake for political
aims. Armenian nationalists had spread rumors that evacuation of the
devastated areas would be used as a pretext for dispersing large numbers of
Armenians outside of their homeland.
In face of the incessant turmoil, Moscow adopted a tougher stance at the
beginning of 1989. The members of the Karabakh Committee in Armenia who had
been organizing the protests were arrested and a curfew was declared.
Furthermore, a significant number of changes were implemented in the
Communist Parties and local governments in Azerbaijan and Armenia. On
January 28, 1989 the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Hasan Seyitov was relieved
of his position due to health reasons and replaced by Ayaz Mutalibov. In
Karabakh the First Secretary of the Communist Party Genrik Pogosian also
retired due to health reasons. Furthermore, Karabakh was placed under direct
rule from Moscow on January 12, 1989 [9]. It was stated that Karabakh would
retain its status as part of Azerbaijan.
These drastic measures implemented by Moscow brought about relative calm for
some time. However a few months later protests started in Armenia demanding
the release of those that had been arrested previously. In Karabakh - now
under the direct rule of Moscow- clashes between the Azerbaijanis and
Armenians in May could only be prevented through the intervention of Soviet
troops. On August 16 a National Council in which only Armenians participated
was established in Karabakh.
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ended direct rule from Moscow over
Karabakh on November 28, 1989. The Special Committee for Nagorny Karabakh
was also dissolved. However Soviet troops remained in Karabakh. Thus,
theoretically Karabakh was returned to Azerbaijan. Yet the Supreme Soviet
demanded from Azerbaijan that it pass new legislation guaranteeing full and
real autonomy for Karabakh. As a reaction to Karabakh being returned to
Azerbaijani rule, the Armenian Parliament and the Karabakh National Council
passed a resolution on December 1, 1989 stating that Karabakh was a part of
a unified Armenian Republic. According to this resolution Armenian laws
would apply in Karabakh and the Karabakh National Council was accepted to be
the legal Government for the region. In Azerbaijan this decision was
protested at a rally organized by the Popular Front which was increasingly
gaining strength as a political movement. Approximately half a million
persons attended the rally. Furthermore, the railroad to Armenia was blocked
for a week.
In January 1990 the Armenian Parliament decided to extend the provisions of
its budget and election laws to cover Karabakh. When the Armenian decision
regarding a “unified Armenia” was found to be unconstitutional by the
Supreme Soviet in Moscow, the Armenian Parliament voted to allow itself to
veto legislation approved by Moscow [10]. These decisions displayed clearly
that Armenia was on its way to independence and that it had the desire to
annex Karabakh.
In Azerbaijan, during protests organized by the Popular Front and attended
by a majority of persons who were refugees from Karabakh and Armenia, the
Government was called upon to reassert full sovereignty over Karabakh, or
resign. Karabakh was returned to the administration of Azerbaijan on
November 28 but order could not be restored.
On January 13, 1990 fighting erupted between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in
Baku. 60 persons died in a few days and most of them were Armenians. On
January 15 the Supreme Soviet in Moscow decreed to the dispatch of armed
forces to Azerbaijan to stop the violence. The troops were authorized to use
firepower. The Supreme Soviet also declared a state of emergency in
Karabakh, and the adjacent regions of Azerbaijan as well as in Baku. In the
meantime, in Baku protests demanding the resignation of the Government were
still underway and barricades were being erected on the outskirts of the
city. The USSR deployed 11.600 troops to Azerbaijan. Along with the 6000
troops already in the country the total number of Soviet troops exceeded
17.000. These units launched an attack on Baku from sea and land on January
19. According to official sources 82 died in street battles. The figure was
as high as 600 according to the Popular Front. On January 20 the First
Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Abdul Rakhman Vezirov resigned
and Ayaz Mutalibov was assigned to replace him. Hasan Hasanov became Prime
Minister [11].
The fact that 750.000 gathered in the largest square of Baku for the funeral
of those killed by the Soviet troops displayed that the resistance against
the USSR enjoyed wide popular support. However, Soviet troops continued to
resort to force on January 24 and 43 leading members of the Popular Front
were arrested. A military decree banned all strikes and protests and
introduced a 30 day administrative detention period without trial. Baku
returned to relative peace. Evacuation of the Armenians and Russians in Baku
was suspended after the Popular Front agreed to guarantee their safety but
more than 30.000 had already been evacuated. According to official figures,
the death toll in the clashes in Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani and Armenian
borders in January 1990 exceeded 200. The representatives of the Popular
Front of Azerbaijan and the National Movement of Armenia met in Riga, the
capital of Latvia, on January 24. On February 15 they agreed to a cease-fire
and the release of prisoners. However low intensity hostilities continued
between the two sides. On February 13 railway traffic resumed. The Supreme
Soviet in Moscow pointed out that efforts of the central authorities to
normalize the situation in the Transcaucasus had achieved no positive
results and ordered authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan to enter into
talks to conclude a treaty aimed at restoring trust. Upon this, the
Azerbaijani and Armenian Prime Ministers met in Tblisi but could not produce
any results.
In the meantime Moscow issued a decree ordering all illegal armed groups to
disband and surrender their weapons or face a crackdown by security forces
or army units. This decision was pertinent not only for the armed groups in
the Caucasus but for those in Central Asia as well. It was also a warning
for the Baltic States where unrest was rising. The newly elected Armenian
Parliament voted to suspend the application of this decree on Armenian
territory.
The new Parliament established following elections in Armenia convened on
July 20. On August 4, 1990 Levon Ter- Petrosian was elected Speaker of the
Armenian Parliament. This office was the equivalent of Head of State. The
candidate of the Communist Party, Vladimir Movsisian received only 80 votes
whereas Ter-Petrosian received 140. Vazgen Manukian was appointed Prime
Minister [12]. Both Ter-Petrosian and Manukian were members of the Karabakh
Committee mentioned above. The fact that these persons were elected to the
highest offices in Armenia showed that Communist rule in Armenia had
effectively come to an end.
On August 23, 1990 the Armenian Parliament adopted a Declaration of
Independence. According to this, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic was
renamed as the Republic of Armenia. It was stated that Armenia was a self
governing state, endowed with the supremacy of state authority, independence
and sovereignty. It was also stated that only the constitution and laws of
the Republic of Armenia were valid for the whole territory of the Republic
of Armenia. According to the Declaration, military units of other countries
and their military bases could be located on the territory of the Republic
of Armenia only by the decision of the Armenian Parliament. The Republic of
Armenia was to conduct an independent foreign policy and could establish
direct relations with other states and national state units of the USSR.
Armenia was to create its own currency, national bank, tax and custom
services and its own system of education. As is evident, Armenia would
become a fully independent state. However the Declaration did not state that
Armenia was declaring independence from the USSR. It appears that Armenia,
while becoming de facto independent tried at the same time to preserve the
protection of the USSR.
In the Armenian Declaration of Independence only a passing reference is made
to the union of Armenia and Karabakh because it is assumed that the two are
already united. In fact this union was not legal since it had not been
approved either by Azerbaijan to which Karabakh was attached or the USSR
which had a say over the status of the “independent region”.
In the meantime, it must be pointed out that the Armenian Declaration of
Independence also contained an article on Turkey. Article 15 of this
document reads: “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of
achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Turkey and
Western Armenia”. This article not only accepted the claims of genocide
which Turkey categorically rejected, it went further to state that
international recognition would also be sought. The same article implied
also that by referring to Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia, the
territorial integrity of Turkey was not being recognized. In line with this
thinking, Armenia still has not declared that it recognizes the Kars Treaty
of October 13, 1921 which established the border between the two states and
which had been signed by the Armenian SSR.
In brief, the Declaration of Independence has caused Armenia to become
embroiled in conflict with Azerbaijan due to Karabakh and led to conflict
with Turkey as well, due to claims of genocide and by not recognizing
Turkish territorial integrity.
When few months later the hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the
border regions intensified, Soviet troops helped Azerbaijani forces in
accordance with the Moscow decree mentioned above. This was met by the
protests of Armenians. Ter- Petrosian blamed the Soviet leader of
cooperating with Azerbaijan to both punish the nationalistic Government of
Armenia and uphold the Communist regime in Azerbaijan. Gorbachev had
prepared a new Union Treaty, in a last effort to save the crumbling USSR.
Azerbaijan signed this treaty alongside eight other Soviet Republics while
Armenia refused to become party to it [13].
While the hostilities were continuing Russian President Yeltsin, and Kazak
President Nur Sultan Nazarbayev were able to achieve a cease-fire agreement
between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh on September 24, 1991. According to
this agreement all armed groups were to disarm and withdraw from Karabakh,
leaving behind only Soviet troops. Hostages were to be freed and people
returned to the villages they had been obliged to abandon. An estimated 800
people had died in clashes since 1988 and therefore the cease fire agreement
was received well. Yet in the clashes that occurred 2 days later 15 were
killed. It was difficult to claim that either Azerbaijan or Armenia was in
complete control of the armed groups. On November 20 an Azerbaijani
helicopter carrying a high ranking officer as well as civilians was shot
down. Armenia did not accept Azerbaijani allegations regarding the incident.
It is worth noting that shortly before the incident Azerbaijan had cut off
gas supplies to Armenia.
On November 21, 1991 the Azerbaijani Parliament annulled the autonomous
status of Nagorny Karabakh which would be governed henceforth by National
Unity Council [14]. The next day the USSR called on Azerbaijan and Armenia
to abrogate all acts that would change Karabakh’s legal status. Both states
accepted this decision which was in favor of Azerbaijan Karabakh being
legally attached to it.
The Referendum on the independence of Armenia from the Soviet Union was held
on September 21, 1991 and witnessed a record turnout of 95%. 94% voted in
favor of independence from the Soviet Union [15]. On September 23 Armenia
declared independence. The independent Armenian state covered 29.800 km2 and
had a population of 3.283.000. The Nationalist Party to which President
Ter-Petrosian also belonged was ruling Armenia. The Armenian Communist Party
had ceased its activities in August.
In Azerbaijan only Ayaz Mutalibov joined the presidential elections of
September 9, 1991. The Popular Front represented the rising political force
in the country but was preoccupied with internal problems. On October 18 the
Azerbaijani Parliament decided on independence. The referendum on December
29 affirmed this decision [16]. The newly created Republic of Azerbaijan was
86.600 km2 in size with a population of 7.023.000. The country was being
administered by Ayaz Mutalibov’s Communist Party.
The Armenians in Karabakh held a referendum in parts of the region under
their control and declared their independence on December 10, 1991 [17]. On
December 28 they held parliamentary elections. 11 of the 81 seats in the new
parliament were reserved for Azerbaijani Parliamentarians. Yet as the
Azerbaijanis had not participated in the elections and considered them to be
illegitimate, the seats were left vacant. On January 3, 1992 the Armenian
Parliament recognized the independence of Karabakh. On January 8 Artur
Mkrtchyan became Head of State [18]. In the meantime Karabakh applied for
membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States but was not admitted.
According to the 1979 population census of the USSR the population of
Karabakh was 160.000, of which 75 % were Armenians and the remainder
Azerbaijanis [19]. As the Azerbaijanis fled or were forced to leave the
region due to war, approximately 120.000 Armenians had remained in Karabakh
when independence was declared.
In response to Karabakh declaring its independence, Azerbaijan placed the
region under direct Presidential rule on January 2, 1992 and Salam Memetov
was made responsible of the administration of the area. Yet this appointment
was of little consequence since Azerbaijan did not control a large part of
the said territory.
The USSR ceased to exist on December 21, 1991. Eleven of the former
Republics, including Armenia and Azerbaijan created a loose union amongst
themselves and named it the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The
Baltic States and Georgia did not join.
Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia two days before the United
States on December 24, 1991. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel sent a message
to President Ter-Petrosian and asked that territorial integrity and the
inviolability of borders is respected [20]. This message was aimed at the
indirect claims on Turkish territories voiced in the Armenian Declaration of
Independence. Turkey was also disturbed by the allegations of genocide in
the same document. When Armenia did not change its position on these issues
Turkey did not establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan.
On the other hand the Government of Demirel tried to establish good
relations with Armenia. Armenia received its energy in the form of natural
gas from the USSR and also from the Metsamor nuclear power plant. Due to the
difficult internal situation in Georgia there was frequent disruption in the
supply of gas. The nuclear power plant utilized outdated technology and
would frequently be shut down as well. Turkey supplied Armenia with
electricity during these dire economic times and donated 100.000 tons of
grain. Turkey also undertook significant efforts for the resolution of the
Karabakh conflict. Prime Minister Demirel summarized Turkish policy in the
following statement: “To stay away from the conflict and to utilize
diplomatic means to resolve it” [21]. This moderate policy, however, did not
bring about a change in the Armenian stance on Karabakh or the demands it
directed at Turkey.
When Armenian forces started the invasion of Karabakh, Turkey tried to help
Azerbaijan without upsetting Turkish-Armenian relations. The USA and
European countries had adopted a position favoring Armenia as they were
under the influence of the Armenian diaspora. The Demirel Government
insistently cautioned that other states should not take sides in the
conflict, that a new Israel should not be created in the Caucasus and that
Armenia may become unwilling to negotiate if it felt the support of European
states [22]. On the other hand, much `humanitarian aid` was being provided
to Armenia from western states. Turkey allowed this aid to transit its
territory and airspace but strictly controlled the shipments fearing that
they may contain weapons.
This moderate policy of the Demirel Government towards Armenia drew much
criticism in Turkey. On numerous occasions opposition leaders such as Bülent
Ecevit and Mesut Yılmaz accused the Government of following a passive
policy. As we shall see below, President Turgut Özal had a similar opinion.
In many Turkish cities rallies against Armenia were organized.
When Turkey started helping Azerbaijan, Armenian politicians begun to
disagree between themselves about the policy to follow regarding Turkey.
Raffi Hovannisian, the Foreign Minister of Armenia, who was also an American
citizen in his speech at the Istanbul meeting of the Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers on September 10, 1992 voiced the claims of genocide
and also said that Turkey had lost the neutral position it had initially
displayed on the Karabakh issue. Hovannisian also said that Turkey should
not make the resolution of the Karabakh conflict a pre-condition for
normalization of relations with Armenia [23]. Furthermore, Hovannisian was
critical of President Bush for US neutrality in the Karabakh conflict.
Hovannisian resigned at the request of President Ter-Petrosian on October
16, 1992.
The disintegration of the USSR had a negative reflection on the Karabakh
conflict. The USSR could legally determine who would administer this region
and how. Problems had decreased when it had chosen to temporarily administer
the region itself. On the other hand, the USSR also had the authority to
send troops to the region. However when it became clear that the USSR would
disintegrate the troops in and around Karabakh started to retreat, causing
an escalation in the clashes between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis.
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief of CIS, after the Hodjali massacre
ordered the withdrawal of troops stationed in Karabakh and on the
Armenia-Azerbaijan borders areas. He also told his troops to destroy all
weaponry which could not be removed. However withdrawal of Soviet troops
took time and did not start until June. Some of these forces remained in
Armenia and later Russian military bases were set up in this country.
Hostilities in Karabakh increased in February 1992. Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Hüseyin Sadıkov and his Armenian counterpart Raffi Hovannisian met
in Moscow on February 20 and called for a cease-fire. They also requested
the granting of access for humanitarian deliveries. In the meantime, the
Azerbaijani Parliament refused to endorse a peace plan of President Ayaz
Mutalibov that called for cultural autonomy for Karabakh within Azerbaijan.
On February 25, 1992, Armenian forces took the town of Hodjali which lay to
the north of Hankendi (Stepanekert). One source reported that more than 600
Azerbaijani civilians were killed, 127 wounded and 487 were taken prisoner
[24]. Some have observed that the 366th Regiment of the Soviet Army (which
had not left the region yet) had also participated in the assault [25]. Yet
there is no indication that Moscow had ordered such an attack. Another
source indicated that discipline had broken down in numerous parts of the
Soviet Army, with many of the troops deserting, selling their weapons or
shelling one or the other side of the conflict in return for money [26].
The Hodjali massacre caused great anger in the Azerbaijani public. Ayaz
Mutalibov, who was trying to find a solution to the conflict in line with
Moscow’s wishes resigned following massive demonstrations and accusations of
failing to save Azeri lives in Karabakh. Yakup Mehmetov was appointed
interim President.
The Hodjali massacre also caused great sensitivity in Turkey. Protests were
organized in Istanbul. In an interview with the Financial Times President
Özal proposed a blockade of Armenia to support Azerbaijan [27] but the
Demirel Government was more cautious and sought the support of the Russian
Federation, USA and France in obtaining a cease-fire. Minister of Foreign
Affairs Hikmet Çetin proposed a six point peace plan to the concerned
parties, international organizations and members of the UN Security Council.
However Armenia refused to examine this plan, accusing Turkey of not being
neutral.
On the other hand Iran succeeded to bring together in Teheran
representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia on March 15, 1992 and had them
sign an agreement envisaging a cease-fire and the lifting of economic
sanctions. Although there were some skirmishes, generally the provisions of
the said agreement were implemented for sometime.
During the CSCE Foreign Ministers meeting held in March 1992 in Helsinki, it
was agreed that a peace conference in Minsk comprising Azerbaijan and
Armenia would be convened with the participation of a delegation from
Karabakh as observer. Furthermore, the USA, the Russian Federation, Germany,
France, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Turkey would also join the conference.
Preparatory meetings were held in Rome but the conference could not be held
because the Armenian Administration of Karabakh would not accept the status
of observer. The countries that were to join the conference accepted to work
together for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict under the Minsk Group
name. Despite the fact that it has been unsuccessful, the Minsk Group has
remained the primary party responsible for the resolution of the conflict
until today.
On May 8 Armenian forces took the town of Shusha. With the loss of this town
almost all of Karabakh was now in Armenian hands. Armenian forces then
targeted regions outside of Karabakh and on May 17 took Lachin, thereby
enabling Armenia and Karabakh to be joined by a land corridor.
The loss of the historic city of Shusha caused upheaval inside Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani Parliament blamed acting President Yakub Mehmetov for
setbacks and reinstalled ex- President Mutalibov on May 14. Mutalibov
cancelled the presidential elections scheduled for June 7 and declared a
state of emergency in Baku. The next day 20.000 Popular Front supporters
occupied the Parliament and Presidential Palace. Mutalibov fled and Isa
Kamber was made President until elections.
In the meantime, one day after Shusha fell Armenian troops launched an
attack on the town of Sadarak in Nakhichevan, near (10 km) the Turkish
border. Like Karabakh, Nakhichevan was an independent region attached to
Azerbaijan. Armenian nationalists always claimed the region, stating that it
was a part of “historical Armenian lands”. The simple fact that like
Karabakh, the word Nakhichevan is not known as a word with meaning in the
Armenian language should be sufficient to counter this claim. On the other
hand, unlike Karabakh, the population of Nakhichevan is Azerbaijani.
Turkey took a close interest in Nakhichevan because of the common border
with this region as well as due to the fact that it was one of the parties
that with the Soviet Union, Armenia and Azerbaijan established the status of
the said region with the 1921 Kars Treaty.
The assault on Sadarak caused concern in Ankara. Since the Armenians had
easily occupied Karabakh, there were fears that they could do the same in
Nakhichevan. The Council of Ministers met and decided that Armenia had to be
warned that Turkey would not allow the occupation of Nakhichevan and would
not accept a change in the present borders [28]. At the same time the
President of Nakhichevan, Haydar Aliyev, requested military assistance from
Turkey. Azerbaijani interim President Isa Kamber stated that the 1921 Kars
Treaty authorized Turkey to militarily intervene in Nakhichevan. The
Commander of the Turkish Army General Muhittin Füsünoğlu said that the armed
forces were prepared for a potential operation [29].
Bülent Ecevit, one of the leaders of the opposition, was demanding that
Turkey intervene in Nakhichevan as soon as possible, warning that if Armenia
were to occupy the region it would start demanding territories from Turkey
[30]. Prime Minister Demirel was saying that an immediate military operation
was not in question [31]. President Özal, on the other hand, was of the
opinion that the territories that Armenians had occupied in both Karabakh
and Nakhichevan must be taken back and that Turkey too had some
responsibility in seeing this done [32].
At the same time the Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, was expressing that a third
country joining the conflict could lead to World War III [33]. On 15 May
1992 - three days before the assault in Sadarak - a defense agreement had
been signed in Tashkent between five CIS countries, including Russia and
Armenia but excluding Azerbaijan. According to this agreement the signatory
states would assist each other if their security would be endangered. This
meant that the Russian Federation would have to assist Armenia if its
security would be threatened.
The Turkish Government seemed determined to resolve this crisis through
diplomatic means. With this aim it contacted all concerned states and
international organizations. To quote Prime Minister Demirel; Armenia was
“placed in a diplomatic straight jacket” [34]. This initiative resulted in
the USA, England, Iran, Georgia, EU and NATO issuing statements stressing
that borders could not be changed with the use of force. The Nakhichevan
crisis finally ended when the Russian Federation also criticized Armenia and
declared that it would not support illegal activities.
One issue that needs to be addressed regarding Nakhichevan is whether in
fact the provisions of the Kars Treaty or Moscow Treaty both concluded in
1921 enable Turkey to militarily intervene in the said region. With the
Moscow Treaty Turkey and the USSR agreed to Nakhichevan becoming an
autonomous entity under the protection of Azerbaijan. Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Armenia agreed to the same status with the Kars Treaty. There are no
provisions in these Treaties as to how the parties are to act if the
treaties are violated and therefore there is also no mention of whether the
parties have a right to use military force. This being the case, each state
will have to determine what course of action it will take if the autonomous
status of Nakhichevan is violated.
Returning to events relating to Karabakh, the Presidential elections in
Azerbaijan that were held on June 7, 1992 were won by Abulfaz Elchibey, the
leader of the Popular Front. Azerbaijani forces launched a counteroffensive
on July 12 and in the followings days took the town of Mardakert (Ağdara) in
the north east of Karabakh as well as about 15 villages in the same region.
The success of the Azerbaijani forces can partially be attributed to the
fact that they had received their share of weapons from the disintegrated
USSR [35].
Azerbaijan reclaiming Mardakert caused a crisis in Karabakh and the
Government resigned. A state of emergency was declared. A Defense Committee
which was invested with governmental power until the end of the war was
established and Robert Kocharian was appointed to head it. He was a close
associate of the Armenian President Ter-Petrosian.
The success of Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh led to Armenia reviewing its
fundamental policy regarding Karabakh. On July 8 the Armenian Parliament
passed a resolution in which it pledged consistent support for Karabakh and
the rights of its population and went on to state that any document
referring to Karabakh as being within the structure of Azerbaijan would be
unacceptable [36]. Thereby Armenia had refused any solution to the Karabakh
conflict according to which the said territory would remain within the
boundaries of Azerbaijan.
The fighting concentrated in Lachin, namely around the corridor that had
been established between Armenia and Karabakh. The cease-fire mediated by
Kazakhstan on August 28 was violated, as was a second cease-fire, brokered
by Russia on September 25. The offensive that Azerbaijani forces staged with
the aim of taking control of the Lachin corridor was repulsed. In December
the Armenian forces initiated an attack through which they regained most of
the territories which they had previously lost.
As was pointed out above, Azerbaijan had signed an Agreement to join the
CIS. However in a vote on October 7, 1992, the Azerbaijani Parliament
decided not to ratify this Agreement. A few days later on October 12,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey
signed a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security in Moscow
[37]. According to this agreement the parties would respect each others
territorial integrity, inviolability of their borders and their
independence. They were also committing to not resorting to use of force or
the threat thereof, not intervening in internal affairs and respecting human
rights. The principles regarding territorial integrity and the respect for
the inviolability of borders were in favor of Azerbaijan. It is noteworthy
that since Armenia claimed that Karabakh had never been a part of
independent Azerbaijan it did not consider itself to be in violation of any
of the mentioned principles.
1993 started with a joint peace initiative of Presidents Bush and Yeltsin.
On January 3 the two leaders issued a statement calling for an immediate end
to the bloodshed and resumption of peace negotiations under the aegis of the
CSCE. Yet the hostilities continued, albeit at a lower intensity, as it was
winter.
Armenia in particular went through a difficult winter that year. Industrial
production ceased for two weeks. On January 23, the entire country was left
without lighting when Azerbaijanis in Georgia blew up a section of pipeline
bringing gas to Armenia. Prime Minister Khosrov Haroutunian resigned. The
new Prime Minister Hrand Bagratian stated that the top priority was to be
solve the food and energy crisis. With U.S. help Armenia received 13 million
Dollars credit from the World Bank and 59,4 million Dollars credit from the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [38].
While the opposition in Turkey continued to criticize Karabakh policies, the
Government pursued its peace initiatives. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet
Çetin declared during a visit to Azerbaijan that Turkey and Russia had
drafted a three stage plan aimed at ending the conflict. According to this
plan, in the first phase the parties would declare a cease-fire. In the
second phase all foreign military personnel around Karabakh would withdraw
and finally, in the third phase all roads to Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Nakhichevan would be opened. But continuing fighting prevented the plan from
being considered.
The Armenian forces took the town of Kelbajar on April 4, as well as its
surroundings, thereby establishing a second corridor between Karabakh and
Armenia. About 40.000 Azerbaijanis fled the region as a result of the
assault. Armenian troops also attacked southwards from Karabakh towards the
town of Fizuli. Like Lachin, both Kelbedjar and Fizuli were Azerbaijani
lands outside Karabakh. The fact that fighting had spilled over from
Karabakh into Azerbaijan constituted an escalation. Armenia denied that its
regular troops were involved in the fighting and pretended that those
fighting in this campaign were Armenians from Karabakh. However it was
difficult to believe that the Armenians of Karabakh who numbered at most
120.000 people could easily overcome Azerbaijan with a population of 7
million.
When Kelbajar fell Turkey took two decisions: First it stopped all scheduled
and charter flights to or from Armenia. Second, it brought the matter to the
Security Council. The Chairman of the Council issued a statement on April 7,
expressing serious concern about developments as well as a call for a
cease-fire and withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied areas. However
Turkey’s proposal that the Security Council condemn Armenian aggression
against Azerbaijan was rejected.
The fall of Kelbajar once again displayed the differences of opinion between
President Özal and the Demirel Government. Prime Minister Demirel continued
to state that there would be no Turkish military intervention in Armenia
[39] while President Özal stressed that the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict
was no longer defined by the issue of Karabakh and had taken the form of the
“dream of greater Armenia,” therefore forcing Turkey to take military
precautions. He said that military maneuvers could be conducted on the
Armenian border and pointed out that in this day and age nothing could be
achieved without taking a certain amount of risk [40].
Turgut Özal died unexpectedly on April 17, 1993. Elchibey and Ter-Petrosian
met when both came to Ankara to attend his funeral. It was decided that
negotiations should resume under the auspices of the OCSE.
On the other hand, the Security Council passed Resolution 822 on April 20,
1993 and demanded the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile
acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire as well as immediate
withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Kelbedjar district and other
recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan. The Council furthermore urged all
parties concerned to immediately resume negotiations for the resolution of
the conflict within the framework of the peace process of the Minsk Group of
the CSCE. The Resolution reaffirmed also the respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all states in the region, the inviolability of
international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force. As there
was no doubt that Kelbedjar and its surroundings were territories of
Azerbaijan, this wording was in favor of Azerbaijan. On the other hand
mention of the invasion of the Kelbajar district by the “local Armenian
forces” left the impression that Armenia was not responsible of the
occupation of Azerbaijani lands. Furthermore, the usual criticism of the
aggressor was not included in this Resolution. Finally, there was no mention
of what the Security Council would do if its demands would not be met. In
short, this Resolution was not of the substance to stop the aggressors.
Three days after this Resolution was adopted Turkey, Russia and the U.S.
tabled a peace plan. The plan called for the withdrawal by mid-May of
Armenian forces from Kelbedjar which would be followed by a two month
cease-fire during which CSCE sponsored negotiations would resume. Azerbaijan
accepted the plan. The Armenian Government described the plan as positive
but refused to approve it, claiming that the “Republic of Karabakh” required
clarifications. A slightly amended version of the plan was approved on May
26 by Azerbaijan and Armenia but Karabakh’s Armenian Administration rejected
it on the grounds that it failed to provide guarantees for the safety of the
population and failed also to end the Azerbaijani economic blockade [41].
Meanwhile the Elchibey regime in Baku was losing power due to military
defeats that were being suffered at the hands of the Armenians. Colonel
Suret Huseinov who had been stripped of his rank for disobeying orders
rebelled in Ganja. He repelled the forces of the Azerbaijani Army and began
advancing on Baku. This led to the resignation of Prime Minister Panah
Huseinov and the Speaker of Parliament Isa Kamber. On June 15, 1993 the
President of Nakhichevan, Haydar Aliyev, was elected Speaker of the
Azerbaijani Parliament. Unable to prevent the advance of the forces of
Huseinov, Elchibey left for Nakhichevan on June 18 but he did not resign. On
June 21 Huseinov’s forces entered Baku and he declared for himself all the
powers of the Head of State. The Parliament stated that Elchibey was
incapable of effective control over the situation in the country or of
performing his function and handed over presidential powers to Aliyev.
Huseinov was appointed Prime Minister and Supreme Commander [42].
This confusion in Azerbaijan had presented the Armenians with the
opportunity to attack once again. Mardakert, the last major town in Karabakh
still held by the Azerbaijanis fell on June 27 and a Russian brokered
cease-fire was declared. Three weeks later, on July 24 Armenian forces
attacked again, this time taking the town of Agdam to the north of Karabakh
as well as its surroundings.
The Security Council called into emergency session by Turkey, convened on
July 29, 1993 and passed Resolution 853 that contained the same elements as
Resolution 822. It differed in stating that it condemned the seizure of the
district of Agdam and all other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan; it
also condemned all hostile actions in the region, in particular attacks on
civilians and bombardments of inhabited areas but the wording did not
clarify who the aggressor was or who was being condemned. Furthermore, the
Resolution urged the Government of the Republic of Armenia to exert its
influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Karabagh region of
the Azerbaijani Republic with Resolutions 822 and the acceptance by this
party of the proposals of the Minsk Group of the CSCE. This wording allowed
one to infer that the aggressors were the Armenians of Karabakh. The only
substantial positive aspect of the Resolution was that although indirectly,
it affirmed that Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan.
It was clear that with such wording, Resolution 853 would have as little
effect on the Armenians as Resolution 822. Indeed, shortly after Resolution
853 was passed, Armenian forces took Jebrail on August 18, Fizuli on August
23, Kubatly on August 31 and Goradiz on September 3. At this point Russia
intervened and established a cease-fire.
The towns mentioned above are very close to Iranian border and the
Azerbaijanis fleeing from the Armenians had to take refuge there. Since this
region of Iran is inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis, the Iranian Government
wanted to prevent the influx of refugees and to do so, approximately 1000
Iranian troops entered Azerbaijani territory. This was seen as an escalation
in the Karabakh conflict and was met with the protests of concerned parties,
including Turkey. The problem was overcome when Iran agreed to build
facilities to house 100.000 Azerbaijani refugees displaced by the Karabakh
war [43].
It was observed that the Armenian side felt uneasy when the Turkish military
units on the Armenian border were reinforced. President Ter-Petrosian called
President Demirel on September 6 and voiced his concern, pointing out the it
was not they who were responsible for the events but the Armenians of
Karabakh. Demirel responded by saying that the occupation of Azerbaijani
territories was causing an outrage in Turkey and that the occupation had to
be stopped immediately [44].
At the same time there were important internal developments taking place in
Azerbaijan. In a referendum held on August 29, 1993, 97,5 % of the
participants stated that they had no confidence in Elchibey. Aliyev won the
Presidential elections on October 3, securing 98,8 % of the votes [45].
After coming to power Aliyev took two important decisions.
The first was to make Azerbaijan a member of the CIS. The most important
criticism Russia directed at the Elchibey Government had been regarding its
unwillingness to make Azerbaijan a member of this organization. It was
speculated that the Russian policy of siding with Armenia on the Karabakh
conflict could be traced to Azerbaijani unwillingness to join the CIS. Now
it was expected that Russia would implement a more balanced policy. However
Azerbaijan continued to suffer defeats in Karabakh after it became member of
the CIS.
Aliyev’s second important decision was to sign an agreement with a
consortium of western oil companies led by BP on November 2, 1993. Thereby
Azerbaijan not only opened a path to significant financial resources but
also found it easier to voice its views in the United States.
On October 14, 1993 the United Nations Security Council passed another
Resolution calling upon all parties concerned to make effective and
permanent the cease-fire. This new Resolution numbered 874 reiterated the
main points of Resolutions 822 and 853. The Resolution furthermore called
for the implementation of the timetable concerning the withdrawal of forces
from recently occupied territories and the removal of all obstacles to
communication and transportation. None of the parties was condemned.
Ten days after Resolution 874 was passed, Armenian forces violated the
cease-fire and attacked the Zengelan region of Azerbaijan. Approximately
50.000 Azerbaijanis crossed the Arax River and fled to Iran. The Security
Council passed Resolution 884 on November 12, 1993 and as had become
standard practice at this point, reiterated the principles of the previous
Resolutions. Furthermore, it stated that continuation of the conflict in and
around the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the tensions between Armenia
and Azerbaijan would endangber peace and security in the region. It also
stated that it condemned the violations of the cease-fire and particularly
the occupation of the Zengelan district and the city of Goradiz, attacks on
the civilians and the bombardments of the territory of Azerbaijan. The
resolution demanded immediate cessation of armed hostilities, withdrawal of
occupying forces from the Zengelan district and the city of Goradiz and from
other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan and strongly urged the concerned
parties to make effective and permanent the cease-fire and continue to seek
a negotiated settlement of the conflict within the context of the CSCE Minsk
Process.
On December 21, 1993, Azerbaijani forces launched a counter-attack. They
succeeded in retaking Goradiz and Agdam and seized some territory in the
Kelbajar region as well. Although a cease-fire that would come into effect
on March 1, 1994 was signed as a result of a Russian initiative, low
intensity fighting continued. On March 22 Armenian forces went on the
offensive and retook almost all of the above mentioned regions. These last
hostilities showed that Azerbaijan could not liberate its occupied
territories while also proving that Armenian forces could not advance any
further. This situation made a lasting cease- fire possible.
On May 9, 1994 Rasul Kuliev, the chairman of the Azerbaijani National
Assembly, signed in Bishkek a cease-fire protocol which had already been
signed by the chairman of CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the chairs of
Armenia, Karabakh and Kyrgyzstan legislatures. In summary the protocol
called for a cease-fire and deployment of international forces to act as
peacekeepers. The ratification of the protocol in the Azerbaijani Parliament
met some difficulty. Some opposition deputies claimed that the protocol had
effectively recognized Karabakh as an independent entity and that it
sanctioned the deployment of Russian troops in the region under the guise of
a peace keeping force. After reassurances given by President Aliev that
Russian troops would not be permitted into the conflict zone, the Parliament
of Azerbaijan ratified the protocol [46].
Thus the hostilities that had been ongoing for six years came to a halt but
although ten years have passed since then, peace could not be established
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The main reason for the defeat suffered by Azerbaijan in Karabakh is the
internal turmoil in the country and the implementation of inconsistent
policies. While a single President starting from independence until
cessation of hostilities ruled Armenia, Azerbaijan saw three. Furthermore,
Mutalibov and Elchibey did not leave their offices under normal
circumstances and the country witnessed numerous power struggles that at
times superceded the conflict in Karabakh. Yet another factor that
complicated affairs for Azerbaijan was that its successive Presidents did
not follow similar policies regarding Karabakh. Mutalibov’s pro-Moscow
policies did not bring about a solution. Elchibey disregarded Moscow
entirely and his pan-Turkish policies did not find wide support in either
Turkey or the Turkic states of Central Asia. It was during his tenure that
the Armenians took certain Azerbaijani territories outside Karabakh. Haydar
Aliyev made Azerbaijan a member of the CIS, hoping that Russia would then be
willing to assist to only find that this would not be the case and that he
would have to witness the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani towns such as
Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Kubatly, Goradiz and Zengelan.
As for Armenia, the insistent policy it had been pursuing to separate
Karabakh from Azerbaijan since the 1960’s finally paid off during the
disintegration of the USSR. It has been argued that since an annexation of
Karabakh by Armenia would have constituted a violation of universal
principles such as the inviolability of borders and respect for territorial
integrity, the Armenians of Karabakh were used as proxies that could utilize
the argument of a peoples right to self-determination, thereby separating
Karabakh from Azerbaijan and declaring an independent state. This fictitious
state, however, was not recognized by anyone.
On the other hand, economic measures implemented by Azerbaijan and Turkey
against Armenia coupled by roads frequently severed due to internal unrest
in Georgia quickly turned Armenia into a country under a blockade. The
economic crisis caused about one million Armenians to move to other
countries, mainly Russia. The Armenian economy could not develop and funds
sent by the diaspora and aid received from the World Bank and the European
Bank for Construction and Development became vitally important.
Another result of the Karabakh conflict was that Armenia became dependent on
the Russian Federation. Russia became Armenia’s primary economic partner.
Armenia needed Russian support in nearly all fields and gave this country
military bases. In time, Armenian authorities saw the benefits of a more
balanced approach and tried to develop closer ties with the U.S. and EU
states. This policy termed “complementarity” could not be properly
implemented due to the dependence of Armenia on Russia. Today Armenia
essentially looks like a satellite of the Russian Federation.
As for Turkey, it tried to establish and maintain good relations with
Armenia. With this aim, Turkey became one of the first states to recognize
Armenia, supplying this county with electricity and delivering 100.000 tons
of grain. Armenia however, was captive to its historic prejudices and
strived to gain recognition for its claims of genocide while at the same
time it refused to recognize the borders of Turkey. On the other hand
Turkey’s assistance to Azerbaijan was limited. To compensate this almost
passive policy, Turkey conducted intense diplomatic activities aimed at
halting the fighting and reaching a lasting solution that would take into
consideration Azerbaijani interests. These efforts did not yield any
tangible results. In short, the Turkish policy of establishing good
relations with Armenia while simultaneously contributing to the resolution
of the Karabakh conflict was unsuccessful.
The Russian Caucasus policy could be summarized as regaining the influence
that the USSR has had in this region. However because it chose to support
separatist activities in Abkhazia and Adjaria, Moscow has serious problems
with Georgia and because of the policies it followed regarding Karabakh it
has considerable difficulties with Azerbaijan. This made Armenia Russia’s
sole close partner in the region and this status was further augmented when
Russia obtained military bases in Armenia. It is pointed out that the two
states are in a strategic partnership today. This close relationship shows
that the Karabakh conflict cannot be resolved without the contribution of
Moscow.
Regarding the U.S. certain facts must be taken into consideration when
analyzing its Caucasus policy in general and Armenia policy in particular.
Due to strategic considerations, the U.S. wishes to see security established
in the region and therefore supports the solution of the Karabakh conflict.
However a politically active Armenian diaspora in the United States operates
as much in favor of Armenia and Karabakh as it does against Turkey and
Azerbaijan. For instance, although it was Azerbaijan that was attacked,
Congress cited the Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia to make an amendment in
the Freedom Support Act (Section 975), thereby preventing the U.S.
Government from granting humanitarian assistance to Azerbaijan. One factor
that is in favor of Azerbaijan is its very significant oil reserves. The
fact that Azerbaijan gave western companies the right to produce and
transport its oil was highly appreciated in the United States.
After the cease-fire in Karabakh, the CSCE Minsk Group accelerated the
negotiation process. Starting in 1997 the Group conducted its efforts
through the Russian, American and French co-chairs. Azerbaijan complained
that these countries looked more favorably upon the Armenian position;
Russia due to strategic considerations and France and the U.S. due to the
Armenian diaspora. Nevertheless these three states have continued to guide
the peace process until today.
A plan prepared by the Minsk Group co-chairs in May 1997 gave Karabakh an
autonomous status within Azerbaijan and the right to its own constitution.
It also called for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani
provinces and the town of Shusha, which would be policed by OSCE forces.
Karabakh would be granted the status of a free economic zone [47]. This plan
was accepted by Azerbaijan.
The President of the region of Karabakh, Robert Kocharian, became Prime
Minister of Armenia in May 1997. Arkady Gukasian won the Presidential
elections in Karabakh in September and went on to reject the Minsk Group
plan, claiming that it discounted the achievement of independence. He then
proposed the creation of a federal or common state in which Azerbaijan and
Karabakh would be of equal status.
In December 1997 the Minsk group presented to the parties a plan that was
said to contain a few stages. According to this plan Armenian forces would
first pull out of all Azerbaijani territories except for Shusha and Lachin
and the refugees would be allowed to return. The status of the Shusha and
Lachin corridors would be determined later.
In Armenia there were differences of opinion regarding the proposal of the
Minsk Group. Armenian President Ter-Petrosian described the demands for
independence for Karabakh as unrealistic [48] and favored a step-by-step
approach to the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian administration in
Karabakh stressed that all issues relating to the conflict should be
resolved simultaneously and insisted on independence. As expected, Prime
Minister Kocharian supported the view voiced in Karabakh. When his opinions
on Karabakh were not supported by the Armenian Parliament President
Ter-Petrosian resigned on February 3, 1998. Under the term of the Armenian
Constitution Prime Minister Kocharian became acting President until
presidential election. In the second round of voting held on March 30,
Kocharian was elected President.
A OSCE peace plan tabled in November 1998 envisaged the formation of a
“common state” comprising Azerbaijan and Karabakh. However this plan was
rejected by Azerbaijan under claims that it threatened its territorial
integrity. Azerbaijan stated that it supported the earlier proposal of the
Minsk Group which provided for broad autonomy for Karabakh within Azerbaijan
[49]. Later, on February 21, 2001 Azerbaijan made public the plans prepared
by the Minsk Group. It became evident that the Common State envisioned gave
Karabakh de facto independence, with its own constitution and armed forces
and the right to veto any legislation enacted by the Azerbaijani Parliament.
The mistrust that Azerbaijan felt towards the Minsk Group led to the two
Heads of State of Azerbaijan and Armenia to meet directly. The Minsk Group
only played the role of facilitator. According to press reports during their
meetings in March 2001 in Paris and in Key West in the U.S. in April, the
two Presidents agreed on the following formula: Karabakh will legally belong
to Azerbaijan but will enjoy a very broad autonomy. Armenia will be
connected to Karabakh via a corridor and Azerbaijan will be connected to
Nakhichevan with a similar corridor. It appeared that these corridors would
be in Lachin and Meghri [50]. Armenian forces would pull out of the areas
they had occupied and the railroad would resume its operations. This formula
failed to deliver a result but the fact that the Heads of State as well as
Foreign Ministers continued even today to meet raised hopes for an eventual
settlement.
The Karabakh conflict was dealt with by some international organizations as
well.
Above we have described the Resolutions passed by the UN Security Council.
In these resolutions affirmation of the respect for sovereignty, territorial
integrity of all states in the region, the inviolability of international
borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of
territory were laid out as principles to be adhered to. Statements demanding
the withdrawal of all occupying forces from occupied areas of Azerbaijan and
expressing that Karabakh is a region of the Republic of Azerbaijan run
contrary to the Armenian claims that Karabakh is an independent state that
has taken territories that are in fact its own. However the Security Council
Resolutions did not point out Armenia as an aggressor and did not condemn
this state for its actions.
The Council of Europe started taking a close interest in the Karabakh
conflict after Azerbaijan and Armenia became members of this organization in
2001. Regarding this conflict, most recently the Parliamentary Assembly of
this organization passed Resolution 1416 on January 25, 2005. This
Resolution deserves to be examined closer since it is very recent and all
European states are represented in the Council of Europe.
In this Resolution it is stated that the Parliamentary Assembly regrets that
more than a decade after the armed hostilities started, the Karabakh
conflict remains unresolved. It goes on to point out that hundreds of
thousands of people are still displaced, living in miserable conditions and
stresses that considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still
occupied by Armenian forces and that separatist forces control the Karabakh
region. The Resolution states also that hostilities led to ethnic expulsion
and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the results of ethnic
cleansing. The Resolution adds that independence and cessation of a regional
territory from a state may only be achieved through a lawful and peaceful
process based on democratic support by the inhabitants of such territory and
not as a consequence of an armed conflict leading to ethic expulsion and the
de facto annexation of such a territory to another state.
Furthermore the resolution reads as follows: “The Assembly reiterates that
the occupation of a foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave
violation of that state’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe”
and goes on to remind that Armenia and Azerbaijan committed themselves upon
their accession to the Council of Europe to use only peaceful means for
settling the conflict and to refrain from any threat of using force against
their neighbors.
In the Resolution, reference is made to UN Security Council Resolutions 822,
853, 874 and 884 and Resolution 853 is particularly stressed. Also, member
states are urged to refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions
which might lead to the intensification of the conflict or continued
occupation of territory.
The Resolution goes on to reaffirm the right of displaced persons from the
area of conflict to return to their homes safely and calls all members to
provide humanitarian aid to the hundreds of thousands of displaced people.
In the Resolution, regarding the future status of the region, the Assembly
calls on the Government of Azerbaijan to establish contacts without
preconditions with political representatives of both communities from the
Karabakh region.
In the Resolution the Assembly suggests that if the negotiations under the
auspices of the Co-Chairs fail, Armenia and Azerbaijan should consider
resorting to the International Court of Justice.
Clearly Resolution 1416 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe is not in accordance with Armenian views. Particularly two aspects
are to the disadvantage of the Armenian side; the first is that Karabakh can
not have an independent status since a lawful and peaceful process based on
democratic support by the inhabitants of this territory, as required by the
Resolution, did not take place in Karabakh. On the contrary, the
Azerbaijanis were expelled from their homes and some were killed. This meant
that an “armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion” had taken place as
stated in the Resolution. Secondly, the Resolution expressed that
considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan were still occupied by
Armenian forces and went on to stress that the occupation of a foreign
territory by a member state constituted a grave violation of that state’s
obligations as a member of the Council of Europe. While falling short of
being an open condemnation of Armenia, these words were nonetheless harsh
criticism.
In all the literature on the Karabakh conflict, the least mention is made of
the position of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on this
matter. In fact, this organization has taken numerous decisions regarding
the conflict since 1994. Most recently the OIC Foreign Ministers in their
meeting in Istanbul on June 14-16 2004, passed a Resolution numbered
10/31-P.
The highlights of the said Resolution can be summarized as follows: It
strongly condemned the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the
Republic of Azerbaijan, considered the actions perpetrated against the
civilian Azerbaijani population in occupied Azerbaijani territory as crimes
against humanity and condemned looting and destruction of the archeological,
cultural and religious monuments on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
Furthermore it demanded the strict implementation of the United Nations
Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884, and withdrawal of
Armenian forces from all occupied Azerbaijani territories including the
Karabakh region and strongly urged Armenia to respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
This OIC Resolution called on the UN Security Council to recognize the
existence of aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan and demanded that
the necessary steps under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
to ensure compliance with its resolutions are taken [51]. The Resolution
condemned aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan and decided to take coordinated action to this end at the United
Nations. Furthermore it called on all member states to instruct their
Permanent Representatives at the United Nations in New York, while voting at
the UN General Assembly, to give absolute support to the issue of
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
The Resolution expressed full support for the three principles of the
settlement of the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, contained
in the statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the 1996 Lisbon OSCE
Summit. The three principles mentioned are; the territorial integrity of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, the highest degree of self-rule of the Karabakh
region within Azerbaijan and guaranteed security for this region and its
entire population. These principles were not ratified in Lisbon since
Armenia did not accept that Karabakh remained within Azerbaijan.
The Resolution asked all states to refrain from providing any supplies of
arms and equipment to Armenia and to use such effective political and
economic measures as required in order to put an end to Armenian aggression
and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories.
Lastly, the Resolution called for enabling the displaced persons and
refugees to return to their homes in safety. It also stated concern over the
severity of humanitarian problems concerning the existence of more than one
million displaced persons and refugees in the territory of Azerbaijan and
urged all member states to extend their contributions to these people.
Furthermore, it requested all member states, the Islamic Development Bank
and the other Islamic Institutions to render urgent financial and
humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Clearly the OIC fully supports the Azerbaijani position in the Karabakh
conflict, strongly criticizes Armenia and views some actions of this state
as “crimes against humanity”. With more than 50 members, the OIC has a
significant presence, especially in the United Nations. One incident
displaying the weight of the said organization was witnessed when Azerbaijan
demanded that the Karabakh conflict is discussed at the United Nations at
the end of October 2004 and was opposed by most of the OSCE members who
believed that such a course would harm the efforts of the Minsk Group.
Ultimately it was the votes of the Islamic countries that allowed the issue
to become an agenda item at the General Assembly.
The resolutions passed by the UN Security Council, Council of Europe and OIC
are not of a compulsory nature. However it is not realistic to assume that
international conflicts can be settled without adherence to principles
adopted by these organizations. These include the respect for territorial
integrity, the inviolability of borders and refraining from the use of force
to gain territory. That is why although it has been occupying Karabakh and
some Azerbaijani territories for twelve years, Armenia has been unable to
attain the acceptance of any party regarding its claims that Karabakh is an
independent state or that it requires parts of Azerbaijani territory to
defend Karabakh.
A prompt resolution of the Karabakh conflict will be very beneficial for
Armenia. The economic restrictions that Turkey and Azerbaijan are currently
applying will be lifted and Armenia will able to reach Europe and the near
east via Turkey. This, in turn, will have a profound effect on the Armenian
economy. For Armenia, solving its problems with its neighbors will signify
an improvement in the capacity for obtaining credit as well as bilateral and
international aid. On the other hand this country will be able to divert
significant funds now allocated to defense expenditures to urgently needed
development projects. In short, Armenia will develop rapidly if it resolves
the problems with its neighbors. For all this to be possible, it is expected
of Armenia that it accepts that Karabakh is attached to Azerbaijan within
the framework of a very broad autonomy and that it pulls out of the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, for Karabakh it is
economically more advantageous to be incorporated into Azerbaijan and not
Armenia.
Azerbaijan also stands to benefit significantly from the resolution of the
Karabakh conflict. The war psychology that has been evident for close to 15
years will be dispelled, solutions will be found for the problems of the
internally displaced persons and refugees and vast resources used for
defense will be utilized in other areas. It is only to be expected that
Azerbaijan, having solved the Karabakh conflict and with the oil revenue it
stands to collect, will become the most powerful state in the South
Caucasus.
If the conflict is resolved, the influence of the Russian Federation over
Armenia will gradually weaken. It is also to be expected that the Russian
bases in Armenia will close down eventually. On the other hand it is also
possible that the resolution of the conflict and the peaceful atmosphere
this will create will have a positive reflection on the other conflicts in
the region such as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechnya. This would be to
the benefit of both the Russian Federation and Georgia.
Iran has supported Armenia because it feared the possibility that its own 15
million strong Azerbaijani community may want to unite with those
Azerbaijanis across the border. Therefore, an Azerbaijan that has solved the
Karabakh conflict and has attained a higher economic standard will not be
welcomed by Iran. Yet since this conflict can not continue indefinitely,
Iran must work on resolving its potential ethnic problems by establishing
good relations with Azerbaijan and by granting its non-Farsi population
broad cultural rights.
The resolution of the Karabakh conflict will be in the interest of Turkey in
the geopolitical sense since it would signify a major improvement in
security in the Caucasus and signal the emergence of a more powerful
Azerbaijan. In addition, the opening of the border with Armenia will
increase trade with this country and also allow the utilization of Armenian
roads for transportation to Azerbaijan. However the main problem for Turkey
in its relations with Armenia is not the Karabakh conflict but the fact that
Armenia does not recognize the territorial integrity of Turkey and continues
its allegations of genocide. Therefore, the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict will not be sufficient for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations and it will be necessary to ensure a parallel solution to these
bilateral issues as well.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Ambassador (Retired)
[1] Ömer Göksel İşyar, Sovyet-Rus Dış Politikaları ve Karabağ Sorunu
(Soviet-Russian Foreign Policies and the Karabakh Issue) Alfa Yayınları,
İstanbul, 2004, pp.227-216
[2] Kamuran Gürün, Ermeni Dosyası, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1983, p.227
[3] Donebédian and C. Moutafian, Artash, Histoire du Karabagh, Sevig Press,
Paris 1991, p.93
[4] Ibid, p.95
[5] Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Record of World Events, London,
1988-2000, V:34, p.36034
[6] Keesing’s, V:34, p.36035
[7] Keesing’s, V:34, p.36036
[8] Keesing’s, V:35, p.36471, 36490
[9] Keesing’s, V:35, p.36402
[10] Keesing’s, V:36, p.37169
[11] idem
[12] Keesing’s, V:36, p.37664
[13] Keesing’s, V:37, p.38078
[14] Keesing’s, V:37, p.38582
[15] Keesing’s, V:37, p.38418
[16] Keesing’s, V:38, p.R120
[17] Keesing’s, V:38, p.38733
[18] Mkrtchyan was shot death at his home on April 14, 1992. Karabagh
Parliament called his death “an accident”. On that subject see Patrick Karam
and Thibault Mourges, Les Guerres de Caucase, des Tsars à la Tchétchénie,
Librairie Perrin, Paris 1995, p.91
[19] P. Donabédian and C. Mutafian, p.93
[20] Ayın Tarihi, December 24, 1991 ( Ayın Tarihi (History of the Month) is
published by the Turkish Directorate General of Press and Information on the
web site www.byegm.gov.tr )
[21] Ayın Tarihi, March 19, 1992
[22] Ayın Tarihi, February 12, 1992
[23] Ayın Tarihi, September 10, 1992
[24] Araz Aslanlı, Tarihten Günümüze Karabağ Sorunu (Karabakh Issue from
History to Present Day) in Avrasya Dosyası (Eurasian File), Volume) 7,
Number 1, 2001, Ankara, p.404
[25] Thomas De Wall, Black Garden, Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and
War, New York University Press, New York, 2003, p.170; Thomas Goltz,
Azerbaijan Diaries, M.E. Sharp, New York, 1998, p.124 and Araz Aslanlı,
p.404
[26] Idem, p.312
[27] Ayın Tarihi, March 7, 1992
[28] Ayın Tarihi, March 18, 1992
[29] Ayın Tarihi, March 19, 1992
[30] Ayın Tarihi, May 19, 1992
[31] idem
[32] Ayın Tarihi, May 21, 1992
[33] Kamer Kasım, The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict from its Inception to the
Peace Process, in Ermeni Araştırmaları/Armenian Studies, Number 2, ASAM,
Ankara, 2001, p.174
[34] Ayın Tarihi,
[35] The military “heritage” of the USSR was distributed by the Tashkent
Agreement May 15,1992 between the Soviet Republics. Azerbaijan obtained 220
tanks, 285 guns and 220 military vehicles. But its share of 100 planes and
50 helicopters was not delivered. On that subject see Nazım Cafersoy,
Elçibey Dönemi Azerbaycan Dış Politikası, Bir Bağımsızlık Mücadelesinin
Diplomatik Öyküsü, (Azerbaijan Foreign Policy During Echibey Presidency,
June 1992-June 1993, Diplomatic Story of a Struggle for Independence) ASAM,
Ankara, 2001, p.73
[36] Keesing’s, V:38, p.39018
[37] Keesing’s, V:38, p.39156
[38] Keesing’s, V:39, p.39332
[39] Ayın Tarihi, April 8, 1993
[40] Ayın Tarihi, April 7 and 13, 1993
[41] Keesing’s, V:39, p.39475
[42] On October 6,1994 President Aliev dismissed Suret Huseinov as Prime
Minister in the wake of a coup attempt
[43] Keesing’s, V:39, p,39650
[44] Ayın Tarihi, September 6, 1993
[45] Keesing’s, V:39, p.39694
[46] Keesing’s, V:40, p.40019,20
[47] Keesing’s, V:43, p.41710
[48] Keesing’s, V:43, p.41878
[49] Keesing’s, V.44, p.42636
[50] Ömer E. Lütem, Facts and Comments, in Ermeni Araştırmaları/Armenian
Studies, Number 2, ASAM, Ankara, 2001, p.211
[51] Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter of the United Nations is related to the
“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and
acts of aggression”. This action could be realized by measures involving or
not involving the use of armed force)
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