Springs of Hatred, Springs of Hope: 1965 Events, Diaspora Politics and Turkish Armenians

Keywords:

Diaspora Politics, Turkish Armenians, Armenian Diaspora, 1965 Events, Diasporic Identity Formation, Turco-Armenian Relations

INTRODUCTION

Spring of 1965 witnessed several demonstrations in different parts of the world where Armenian communities were settled. Organized mainly by the political activists and socio-political institutions of the Armenian communities in the metropolises of the countries such as Lebanon, United States, France, and Yerevan these demonstrations were claimed to commemorate the ‘fiftieth anniversary of the ‘genocide’’ and to raise ‘the demands for the restoration of ‘Turkish Armenian’ lands’.[1]

Nature, significance and instrumentality of these events have been interpreted differently at discursive, institutional, and individual levels among the Armenian communities around the world. Thus, these demonstrations connoted different implications for the Armenians living in different conditions and socio-political structures in various countries. These differences in interpretations mainly derived from the national, regional and international contexts in which they were evaluated. In this respect, a Lebanese Armenian attached a different meaning to these demonstrations when compared with a French Armenian; or an Armenian living in Yerevan of Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia interpreted these events differently from an American Armenian living in the United States. In diaspora and the homeland Armenia, these differences among the interpretations were subordinated under a diasporic meta-’discourse around the ‘genocide’’ and hostility towards Turkey.

Nevertheless, the main difference of interpretation remained between diasporic Armenian communities and the Turkish Armenians who interpreted the demonstrations from different politico-cultural perspectives and in different national, regional and international contexts.

From diasporic Armenian point of view, the developments, which started to take place in international and national arenas of Armenian communities beginning from 1965, were heralding a transformation towards diasporic formation that would unify and organize the dispersed Armenian community on ethno-religious basis all over the world. In that respect, these developments were perceived by Armenian diasporic elite as signs of a new diasporic political culture and revival of political activism for the common interest of diasporic all-inclusive socio-cultural formation. The political culture of newly emerging Armenian diasporic establishment was mainly based on debates on politics of identity formation, ethno-religious consciousness, collective memory, relations with the homeland, diasporic institutionalization and endorsement of the idea of struggle against a common enemy. At the initial stage of diasporic identity formation, culture of struggle and promotion of co-responsibility among the members of Armenian community was perceived as a mobilizing factor, which would supposedly consolidate the diasporic identity through activating the diaspora politics for common interests. Nevertheless, due to overemphasis on the politicization of hostilities and the idea of common enemy, the idea of struggle against a common enemy and the feeling of co-responsibility in this struggle seemed to become dominant patterns of diaspora politics and diasporic political identity within the context of diasporic political culture. In this respect, the significance of 1965 seemed to change, in a reductionist way, from the initial signs of mobilization of dispersed Armenian communities for unification under a newly emerging diasporic identity to the initial signs of the struggle against the common enemy.

Turkish Armenians on the other hand, interpreted the demonstrations of 1965 within the international context as a part of regional conflicts and discontents between Turkey and its rivals. In this respect, they saw these political acts as provocation and manipulation of Armenian communities by the foreign actors, particularly the USSR, Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, Greek Cypriots and Greece against Turkey in order to sustain their cases in regional and international politics. The cooperation between the Armenian diasporic formation and the enemies of Turkey on the basis of rallying anti-Turkish sentiments strengthened the suspicions of Turkish Armenians. The resemblance of Armenian diasporic discourse with the discourses of Turkey’s rivals on specific issues, which were mainly concerning the political and strategic interests of these rivals further, reinforced this skeptic and critical discourse of Turkish Armenians against the Armenian diaspora. As it will be more evaluated in the other parts of this article, another point of criticism was raised by Turkish Armenians was about the ‘hatred speech’ and ‘hostility towards Turkey’ within the Armenian diasporic discourse which were meant to consolidate the diasporic identity on the basis of clear-cut definition of ‘the other’ and ‘us’. Nevertheless, Turkish Armenians believed that such an attitude would result in deepening the hostilities between the two nations and would not help solving the problems. Thus they were offering more peaceful ways of settlement of the problems between the Armenian diaspora and Turkey through the means of conciliation. In fact, the relevance of these observations seemed to be realized when the discourse of hatred speech and hostility towards Turkey transformed into diasporic militancy and went beyond the borders of diaspora politics and became an international menace in the form of terrorist activism, which could not be controlled by the diasporic socio-political institutions by the means of political mechanisms.

Under the light of abovementioned discussions, this article aims to evaluate the arguments about the significance of 1965 events within the framework of Turco-Armenian relationships basing on the analysis of two different points of view and political cultures, which were represented by the newly emerging diasporic Armenian community of 1960s and Turkish Armenian community. Within this context, the article will begin with conceptualizing diaspora and diaspora politics within the context of attempts towards transforming of patterns of relationships among Armenian communities following 1965 events. In the second part, significance of 1965 events for Armenian diasporic formation will be examined under the light of debates on the Armenian diasporic identity formation, diaspora-homeland relationship, In this part a particular emphasis will be given on emergence, necessity and implications of discourse of struggle and a common enemy in the process of identity formation and maintenance within the context of Armenian diaspora. Third part will focus on the Turkish Armenians’ point of view regarding the nature and implications of 1965 events. Putting emphasis on the expressed sensitivities of the Turkish Armenian community, their responses to these events will be evaluated in terms of their significance at symbolic, discursive and institutional levels. In the conclusion part the strengths and weaknesses of these two points of views in explaining the significance of 1965 diaspora’s activities will be briefly discussed and a necessity for more in-depth research and analysis of these events within the context of Turco-Armenian inter-communal relations will be mentioned.

CONCEPTUALIZING DIASPORAS AND DIASPORA POLITICS

As emphasized by Gabriel Sheffer diaspora phenomenon was not a subject of academic inquiry until late 1980s.[2] Nevertheless from 1990s onwards there has been a proliferated literature on the study of diasporas. As the theoretical debates on the issues of survival, revival, growth and persistence of diasporas and diasporism were heated in 1990s, the efforts towards developing a precise and comprehensive definition of diaspora increased. Within this context, different aspects of diasporic formations have been analyzed in order to reach a common discursive formulation in defining and understanding these formations.

Despite these efforts, it seems still too early to speak of conceptual clarity and scholarly consensus regarding the use and content of the term diaspora. While some scholars prefer to develop a more broadened and extensive definition of diaspora, others try to set more specific criteria in defining the nature and origins of the diasporic formations. Exerting an all-inclusive understanding of the term diaspora, Tololyan for instance conceptualize the term in its broadest sense, to include immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guestworker, exile community, overseas community and even ethnic communities.[3] Nevertheless such broad definitions seem to lead more specific questions regarding the nature, origin, structure, and patterns of external and internal interactions of the diasporic formations. These questions lead scholars from different disciplines of social sciences to define diaspora in more specific terms. In this respect, different aspects of diasporic formations have been analyzed more deliberately by referring to a variety of research questions within the contexts of sociological, political, anthropological, cultural inquiries.

Within this framework, Ibrahim G. Aoude for instance, stresses the dilemmas of multiple identities among the members of diasporic communities by basing on the studies of De Vos and Romanucci-Ros on ethnic identity and ethnic pluralism.[4] Scholars such as Hall, Brah and Soysal also provide with the conceptual openings on the issues of identity and citizenship within the context of diasporic formations.[5] Vertovec on the other hand puts emphasis on the issues of consciousness within the context of diaspora. He mainly focuses on the centrality of consciousness as a point of reference in the studies of diaspora.[6] In another context of inquiry, Andre Levy, describes the diasporas through anthropological lenses as ‘ a powerful counterpoint to prominent theoretical concepts regarding cultural groups in anthropology’[7] within the context of a scrambled shift from ethnicity towards diaspora. Such a shift from ethnicity towards diaspora is also evaluated by Anthias within discourse and conceptual frameworks of sociological inquiry.[8]

As mentioned above, while conceptualizing diasporic form of social organization in general terms most of the studies on diaspora put emphasis on common cultural and ethnic references, and references of identity and consciousness. These references seem to provide with necessary theoretical and conceptual points of departure for the growing scholarly efforts towards defining diaspora in more specific terms through exploring other components of diasporic formations.

Consequently, moving mainly from ethno-national character of diasporas while defining the nature of diasporic formations, Sheffer for instance, adds more specified references related to the origin, nature and structure of diaspora. Thus he describes the diaspora as a ‘social-political formation created as a result of either voluntary or forced immigration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries by maintaining regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as homelands and with individual groups of the same background residing in other host countries’.[9]

Pnina Werbner shares the view of Sheffer regarding the ethnic character of diaspora but expresses this characteristic as ethno-parochial.[10] Inspired by Benedict Anderson she defines diasporas as ‘deterritorialized imagined communities which conceive of themselves as sharing a collective past and common destiny, and hence also a simultaneity in time’.[11] Chaliand and Rageau, on the other hand, oppose the idea of reducing diaspora to ethno-national or ethno-parochial formations. They argue that diaspora can well be a religious group in its nature.[12]

Apart from the studies about the nature of the diasporas and the ethno-religious characteristics of diasporic communities; a considerable amount of literature on diaspora seem to be centered around the controversial issues such as origins of diasporas, their intra-communal organization and relationships and their connections with the homeland and host countries.

Regarding the origins of diasporic formations Tambiah, for example, asserts two different sources of diasporic communities: ‘Voluntary migration of groups of peoples, mostly with useful occupational skills in search of betters economic opportunities and standard of life elsewhere and [i]nvoluntary displacement of people running away from political turmoil and wars, or refuge from natural disaster in their country’.[13] Chaliand and Rageau on the other hand diverge from this multiple source understanding and they consider the ‘forced dispersion’ caused by politically oriented disaster as the essential component of being a diaspora. Within the context of Armenian communities, Beledian, like Chaliand and Rageau, focuses on the forced and tragic character of dispersion while implementing the definition of diaspora to Armenian case. He makes a distinction between the kaghuts, which consist of people who left their homeland for economic reasons and the diaspora, which has the dispersion as a point of departure.[14] Tololyan on the other hand, opposes to designating 1915 as the origin of the diaspora by arguing that dispersion has not solely taken place within the context of World War I but ‘ it has been part of the Armenian reality for centuries’.[15]

Another controversial issue seems to be the bases of intra-communal unity and organization of the diasporas. Within this context, as mentioned by Marina Oussatcheva main focus of emphasis is centered around the ‘subjective’ core of diasporic existence (which includes issues of collective memories, religious beliefs, national traditions, historical myths, diasporic consciousness, discourses of diasporan identity)[16] and objective core of diasporic organization (which is more related to the mechanisms of self-management, educational, cultural, political, and economic organizations).[17]

Finally the relationship of diasporas with the host countries and the homeland appears as an important component of diasporic formation. While some scholars consider the aspiration to return to homeland as a crucial feature of diasporic experience, some others argue that not all diasporic people wish to return their homelands.[18] In Armenian case, Pattie attracts the attention to the dual relationship of the Armenian diaspora between the feelings of longing a lost homeland and aspirations to integrate into the host country.[19] In this respect, since ‘Armenian homeland and the desired Armenian nation-state do not totally overlap’,[20] Pattie’s remarks on the dual relationship becomes more significant in understanding the attitudes of members of Armenian diaspora while positioning themselves in its relationships with the homeland and the host country.

These discussions regarding the common features of diasporic formations seem to reach a broadly precise level in Safran’s conceptualization of diasporas. Safran puts forward the features of a diaspora as  ‘dispersion from a specific original ‘center’ to two or more ‘peripheral’, or foreign, regions’; retaining a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland feeling of partial alienation and insulation from host countries; tendency of return to ancestral homeland and definition of an ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity by the attachment to this ancestral homeland.[21]

Basing partly on the Safran’s definition, Robin Cohen presents one of the most comprehensive and precise conceptual frameworks about the common features of the form of socio-political organization, which could be called as diaspora.

For Robin Cohen,

‘diasporas exhibit several of following features: 1. dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically 2. alternatively the expansion from homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions 3. a collective memory and myth about the homeland 4. an idealization of the supposed ancestral home 5. a return movement 6. a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time 7. a troubled relationship with host societies 8. a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries and the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries’.[22]

Classifying the Armenian Diaspora as a victim diaspora, Cohen argues that Armenian diaspora conforms well to the general features of the diaspora.[23] For Cohen, by definition it is possible to see the components of diasporic formation in the Armenian social organization such as involuntary migration, collective memory and myth about the homeland, its location and its achievements; and the wish and solidarity for maintaining the safety and prosperity of their homelands; a strong ethnic consciousness; a sense of empathy with other co-ethnic members and creative and enriching life in tolerant host countries.[24]

I would argue that most of these characteristics were absent in the definition of the Armenian groupings prior to 1965 events and they did not result in immediate consolidation of diasporic identity among the Armenian communities even after this so-called turning point due to particularities of these communities and the differences in the nature of their relationship with the host countries. Nevertheless, 1965 events played a remarkable role in mobilizing the Armenian masses on the basis of hostility towards a common enemy and collective memory on the pains of the past. In fact, from 1965 events onwards, the idea and discourse of struggle against a common enemy has become a unifying factor and thus basis of diasporic identity formation among the dispersed Armenian communities. Within this framework, the 1965 events served to initiate discursive and activist efforts in order to spread the feeling of co-responsibility[25] and unity among the members of Armenian communities and institutions to participate in this regenerated antagonistic political activism. In that respect, these events served the promotion of the discursive formation for a struggle against Turkey, which later on would be used in order to legitimize the diasporic militancy and terrorism for achieving diasporan political and ideological goals. Since the identity of diaspora became excessively associated with the hostility towards Turkey, the end of struggle could even bring about important diasporic identity crisis among the Armenian communities, which were connected to each other with the feeling of their co-responsibility in this struggle.

DIASPORA POLITICS

Although diaspora is generally considered as ‘a social-political formation’[26] and a ‘transnational network of dispersed political subjects’[27] by its nature and definition; political dimension of diaspora phenomenon has not been a separate field of study ‘due to lack of in-depth analyses and comprehensive theoretical and comparative debates on the aspects of politics of diasporic formations’.[28] For Sheffer, diaspora politics is mainly about ‘political struggles of dispersed ethnic groups permanently residing in host countries away from their homelands, to maintain their distinctive identities and connections with their homelands and other dispersed groups from the same nations.’[29] Although it is not a comprehensive definition of diaspora politics, one may drive different aspects of this term from the research questions raised in both Sheffer’s study and in the growing literature on diaspora politics. In this respect it is possible to argue that diaspora politics cover political aspects of diasporan identity; political behaviors of collectives and individuals in formation and persistence of diaspora; political organizational structure of diaspora; political strategies and tactics of diaspora’s political institutions in order to achieve diasporan interests;[30] functions of diaspora’s political organizations and their influence in the political spheres of their homelands and host countries; possibilities of trans-state political systems based on diasporic political formations; and diaspora’s political unrest or militancy and its implications for chaotic world order.[31]

Portraying diasporas as constellations of political actions and as projects rather than congealed totalities, Mudimbe and Engel mention the tendencies of diasporas to modify the internal and external hierarchies of countries as well as their historicities.[32] For Rachel Anderson Paul, these political actions, which stimulate the members of the diaspora are formed and mobilized through the use of religion and historical group trauma.[33] Jolanta Drzewicka develops the debate further and argues that constitutive rhetoric of diasporic collectivities, which used to reinvent diasporic identities, mainly aims to legitimate certain forms collective power and action,[34] which would certainly have political implications. In such a context discourses of diasporic identity and consciousness become important components of power relationships or struggles between the collective ‘we’ on the one side ‘ the host countries’ and the ‘common enemy’ on the other side. Basing on the Clifford’s arguments on negative and positive constitution of diaspora consciousness,[35] Ibrahim Aoude also marks the link between production of diaspora consciousness and ‘a struggle’.[36] In this respect, existence of a common enemy is argued to consolidate the diaspora consciousness and help members of dispersed groupings in resolving their conceptualization of ‘us’ and ‘other’ within the context of s common struggle.

While defining the diasporic politics, Tololyan seems to neglect the weight of political culture of struggle and the political discourse of hatred against the common enemy in Armenian diasporic politics. He argues, ‘Armenian diasporic politics often involves status, persuasion, the courting of constituencies into joining community institutions, and the shaping of the consciousness, commitment and loyalty of both militant cadres and lukewarm supporters’.[37] For him, these politics involve rarely repressive diasporic apparatuses while predominantly and always can involve ideological diasporic apparatuses’.[38] Such an approach seems to underestimate the substance of the power of militant cadres and their violent attitudes within the context of Armenian diaspora politics. In the following parts of this article, diaspora politics will mainly refer to all political or politically effective activities organized by the political or non-political actors of diaspora to influence the political events in the host countries, which may have an effect on the diaspora. As it will be evaluated below, in the case of Armenian diaspora, from 1965 to the late 1980s these activities seem to be formulated and practiced in order to serve a struggle against a common enemy.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1965 EVENTS FOR ARMENIAN DIASPORA POLITICS

By many Armenian scholars, 1965 events are accepted as a turning point in terms of redefining the Armenian diasporan identity and revitalization of Diaspora politics. Regarding the redefinition of Armenian diasporan identity, the 1965 events aimed at mobilizing disconnected Armenian communities and their institutions to gather around the collective memory of deportation and against the ‘common enemy’ in order to express an aspiration towards unification under a cohesive and all-inclusive Armenian identity.  By means of doing that, in Bakalian’s words, it would be possible to accelerate the process ‘from being to feeling Armenian’.[39] In line with this, by putting emphasis on 50th anniversary of ‘dispersal from an original homeland’[40] in 1965, the Armenian Diaspora outside Turkey tried to consolidate the diasporic identity all over the world. In this respect, 1965 events were important for Armenian Diaspora in order to provide necessary discursive, organizational and institutional grounds for maintaining two important components of diasporic identity: collective memory and ethnic consciousness.

Consequently, reactivated propaganda which was mainly based on symbols of collective memory and ethnic consciousness and other efforts towards consolidation of group identity seemed to play a significant role in the emergence and activation of Diaspora politics among the Armenian groups all around the world. Within this context, Hovanissian, for instance, stresses the importance of 1965 for the revival of Armenian activism. For him, ‘it was not until 1965 that the politically fragmented Armenian diaspora drew together sufficiently for a united commemoration’.[41] He argues that only after 1965 the Armenians began to externalize their concerns in a politically more organized way.

Tololyan on the other hand focuses on the shifts that affected the transformation of worldwide Armenian community into a diasporic socio-economic and political formation after 1965. Socio-political shifts which took place in Armenian community’s concerns and worldwide relationships following 1965 events at different levels, brought about new dynamics leading emergence of an inclusive political sphere for the Armenian communities. These shifts played an important role in the politicization of Armenian people around the world within the context of redefined patterns and discourses of community. Shifts at discursive level created the necessary discursive grounds for emergence, consolidation and politicization of Armenian diasporic identity.  In this line, for instance, despite the fact that the word diaspora began to be used prior to 1965; the ‘discursive turn from exile to diaspora’[42] began to be politically habituated only after 1965. Two important features of diaspora collective memory and ethnic group consciousness started to be politically regenerated and mobilized within the discursive context of Armenian Diaspora rather than of Armenian exilic nationalism. In fact the discourse of diaspora included some of the discursive components of exilic nationalism but it could not be simply reduced to this discursive formation. As the diaspora’s sense of permanency and homeland orientation began to be strengthened at discursive level, diaspora’s institutions were given ‘a renewed raison d’etre for mobilization while at the same time facilitating the emergence of alternative discourses and institutions.’[43] 

 In this respect an important shift was experienced in the institutional structure of Armenian community. Leading institutions of the Armenian community, the Church, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) or Dashnaktzutiun, the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party, Armenian General Benevolent Union and other institutions were tried to be reorganized within the context of a diasporic institutionalization. Although this institutionalization was necessary in order to produce and disseminate the image of community, diasporan culture and consciousness, in Armenian case it was not easy to achieve it in a short period of time due to the particularities and differences of the dispersed Armenian communities living or being adopted to different socio-political and cultural environments in different countries. In fact, even in a single country, France for example, it was possible to speak of a division among the Armenians who have different cultural, economic and political backgrounds.[44] Thus the institutions of Armenian community, which used to have conflicting ideological among themselves had to find a common ground that would lead them to overcome the political and ideological rivalries among themselves and to unify the Armenian communities within a diasporic structure. This common ground was provided by fueling the hostility against Turkey and through targeting Turkish state as the sole blameworthy for all disasters that have hit the Armenian community. In this respect political conduct of hatred towards the common enemy was expected to undermine the ideological differences among the leading institutions of Armenian community. The cooperation among the ideologically dissimilar Armenian institutions during the organization of 1965 demonstrations indicated the initial signs of such an expectation.

Political culture of struggle and hostility, which was based on the idea of institutionalizing hatred against Turkey brought together even ideologically antithetical Armenian bourgoisie of the Western countries and the socialist comrades of homeland Armenia via exerting augmented emphasis on the perception of a common threat. Within this context, diaspora’s orientation of homeland went along with the outbreak of nationalism in the homeland Armenia.[45] For Gakavian, the year 1965 was significant for the re-awakening in the homeland Armenia as well as for the reimagination of diasporan identity.[46] In fact, spring of 1965 witnessed the climax of new ethnic nationalism, which would challenge the ‘official nationalism’ exerted by the USSR in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. This challenge would be practiced through the ‘new opportunity structures’ (which were triggered mostly by the 1965 events) ‘for more public expressions of ethnic Armenian nationalism in the USSR’.[47] Hovannisian considers these events noteworthy in terms of national politics in the homeland Armenia as well. For him, demonstrations held in Soviet Armenia, which were fueled by the commemoration activities in the Armenian Diaspora, signified a form of restitution at national level[48] in domestic politics. In that sense it may well be argued that 1965 events became instrumental for the Armenian political circles in Soviet Armenia as means of domestic politics in mobilizing the masses. As more crystallized in 1966, the main goal of some political actors of Armenian political sphere such as (National Unity Party) and of the masses who were organized through demonstrations appeared to be ‘ the return of the ‘Turkish Armenian’ lands’’ and a united and independent Armenia which would solve the Armenian question via incorporating all the lost territories in Azerbaijan and Turkey.[49] Within this context, Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic claimed leadership in uniting, assembling and organizing the diaspora toward a united purpose and activities against the common enemy. 

As the vitalization of understanding of ‘common enemy’ promoted the necessary discursive grounds for the unity, another shift was observed in the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland Armenia that would serve diapora’s transformation. Notwithstanding the clashes and conflicts between the leading political circles of Armenia and the leading diaspora institutions over the governance of structured diasporic life,[50] after 1965 the diaspora and the homeland Armenia developed mutual relationship on the basis of unity and achieving the common goals. As mentioned above the unifying factor appeared to be the ‘common enemy’, which would serve political purposes of both institutions of Armenian diaspora and political circles in Armenia without causing an intra-communal conflict. Thus both diaspora politics and domestic politics of Armenia were organized to pursue a struggle against this ‘common enemy’ at national and international levels. Consequently, from 1965 onwards Turkey became a ‘rallying point of diasporic political activity’[51] in the forms of ‘both discursive and organizational struggle’[52] -which would later on lead emergence of Armenian terrorism at its extremes-.

Within the framework of this struggle Turkey and Turkish state began to be defined as ‘blameworthy’ ‘the other’ against the idea of ‘victimized’ ‘us’, which would include both diasporan and homeland Armenians. In this line, Armenian masses began to be mobilized to define themselves against this ‘other’. The idea of a struggle against the ‘common enemy’ was endorsed in order to consolidate the solidarity among the different Armenian communities all around the world. Development of a mythically enriched diasporic history was promoted in order to support the diasporic identity formation through the intense emphasis on the myths and unrealistic plans for regaining the historically important mythical symbols located in the historical ‘original homeland’. This process was sustained by a discourse of survival, which was mainly based on the sense of dispossession, vulnerability and nostalgia developed in parallel to development of strongly conservative and ethnocentric understanding of identity. In fact, such a discourse which, for Oshagan, was rooted in the ideas of preservation of ‘Armenianness, the Armenian spirit, the need for resistance to assimilation and fight for survival’ turned out to be a ‘chronic malaise [that lead spread of] intolerance, xenophobia, authoritarianism, sexism and purism’ in Armenian community’[53]. More significantly in political terms, this discourse cultivated the ‘fear and the hatred of the Turk’ and ‘turned these feelings to almost obsessive feelings’[54] among the Armenian communities. In this respect, was not be a surprise that such a discourse of hatred would soon begin to provide necessary legitimizing discursive grounds for terrorist activism which was not prevented (when not supported) by the institutions, elites or ordinary members of Armenian diaspora.[55]

TURKISH ARMENIANS AND THE 1965 EVENTS

‘ Turkish Armenians perceive themselves as integral part of this country. Thus they would never accept any act against the interest of this country’[56]

‘Every Armenian in Turkey grows up with three elements in his personality: being a Turkish citizen... then his heritage as an Armenian... and then his faith as a Christian in a country which is overwhelmingly 99% Moslem.’…        ‘The Armenians of Istanbul are not part of the Diaspora, we are natives of this land...we were here even before the Ottoman Empire,’ said Mutafyan, backed by pictures of Jesus and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern Turkey’ […]’Our future history should not be blocked by events of the past.’[57]

As explicitly emphasized by two patriarchs of Turkish Armenians with 30 years time difference both S?norhk I Kalusdyan and Mesrob Mutafyan, archbishops and patriarchs of Turkey's Armenians in 1965 and late 1990s, it is not adequate to consider the Armenian citizens of Turkey as a part of Armenian diasporic community even in 1990s. Despite the fact that they share common religious and cultural values and heritage with the diasporic community, Turkey’s Armenians preferred to keep a distance with the Armenian communities settled in the other countries especially in the issues regarding the diaspora politics. In that respect, they did not involve in diaspora politics, which was mainly based on the hate speech and discourse of hostility and struggle against Turkey and its representative institutions. On the contrary, they positioned against any political attempt that could harm Turkey and Turkish state.

For Cohen, a strong attachment to the past or block to assimilation in the present and future must exist in order to permit a diasporic consciousness to emerge or to be retained.[58] For Turkish Armenians this premise was not valid. They were not attached strongly to past. On the contrary, they were not comfortable about thee repetition of old claims and confrontational attitudes in dealing with the problematic questions of the past. They believed that such attitudes would deepen the hostilities between the two nations globally and locally. In that respect, in Turkish Armenian case, the ideas of exclusive citizenship, linguistic conformity, political, obedience, devotion to nation-state, love to the country and reverence to the country’s institutions[59] did not clash with the will and acts of preserving cultural, religious and linguistic heritage of the community.

Common belief among the Turkish Armenians, who presented their views in the forums of public discourse in Turkey seemed to be that the 1965 events were directly connected to international politics and particularly with the Cyprus issue and renewed claims of land by Armenian nationalists. Consequently, Turkish Armenians evaluated the 1965 events within the framework of these two interrelated regional and international issue area, which had significant domestic implications for Turkey.

First issue area was Cyprus, in which Greek Cypriot political elite tried to manipulate Armenian case and community[60] in their propaganda campaigns against Turkey in order to gain international backing for their policies in the island. In fact, according to the news reports, which appeared in Turkish media, Greek Cypriot administration had supported the ceremonies for anniversary of deportation, which was organized in Lefkose, in 24 April 1965 under the patronage of Kleridis, president of Council of Greek Cypriot Representatives.[61] Establishment of Armenian National Committee Greece in 1965, which would maintain offices in various cities of Greece[62] could also be perceived as a sign of probable strategic alliance between the Greek authorities and newly emerging institutional establishment of Armenian diaspora against a common enemy. In this sense this linkage between Cyprus issue and activation of diaspora politics was widely expressed among the members of Turkish Armenian community. In fact one of the main concerns of the Turkish Armenian community was that the Armenian diaspora was used as a political tool by the external political circles such as Greece and Greek Cypriots which were hostile to Turkey in order to reach their political goals within the context of international politics. Within this context, marking the linkage between the Cyprus issue and the Armenian diaspora’s anti-Turkey demonstrations abroad, Berc Turan, a former senator of Turkish republic, of Armenian origin argued in a news article that these demonstrations were manipulated by the sides to the Cyprus issue in order to detach the attention of international public opinion from the inhuman behaviors exerted by the Greek Cypriots in the island and to support their illegitimate claims for annexation of whole Cyprus.[63]

Regarding the second issue, outbreak of nationalism in Soviet Armenia and elsewhere (especially in Lebanon) led homeland Armenia and other militant political groupings of Armenian community abroad to involve more in newly emerging Armenian diaspora politics and even to claim the leadership within diaspora’s growing political sphere. This nationalist political activism was accompanied by claims for the lands from eastern part of Turkey. These claims were sounded especially by the political and intellectual elite of Lebanese Armenians in cooperation with the political circles in Soviet Armenia. In fact, Armenian community in Lebanon was the most militant and politically active Armenian community among the others.[64] It was because of this fact that the demonstrations, which were held in Beirut took place with participation of more people and religious representatives of Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox Armenian communities, notables, and members of parliament than other demonstrations which were held in the U.S. and France. Apart from that, various Lebanese institutions, which were bound to Hinchak, Tashnak, and Ramgavar parties were reported to launch a world-wide campaign regarding the ‘Armenian rights’.[65] Discourse of hostility towards Turkey was obvious in the language of demonstrations expressed in both speeches and brochures delivered in the acts of political struggle.

Thus, the members of Turkish Armenian community did not welcome the 1965 events and they were not attracted to the symbolic and discursive significance of these events in Armenian diaspora politics. On the contrary they perceived these activities as a source of hostilities, which would harm both sides. Interpreting these issues within the national and international contexts, the reactionary responses of the Turkish Armenians against the diaspora’s political acts within the context of commemoration took place at symbolic, discursive, and institutional levels. Immediate response of the Turkish Armenian community was to declare detachment of the community from the political activities, which were organized and put into practice by some groups within the Armenian diaspora.

At symbolic level, Turkish Armenians organized demonstrations and put flowers to the Monument of Republic on 24 April 1965 as a sign of protest against the campaign conducted by some groups within Armenian community targeting Turkey. Berc Turan, a former senator of Turkish Republic, of Armenian origin, wrote to the notebook in the monument that Turkish Armenians were sharing a unified faith to future and feeling of solidarity with their Muslim brethren in the Republic of Turkey which was established under the leadership of Ataturk and which would eternally survive.[66] Yervart Bezaz who was interviewed as the representative of the protestor Turkish Armenian group in Istanbul, stated that this symbolic act was a sign of their loyalty to Turkey which indicated Turkish Armenians reaction in response to the destructive propaganda conducted by the Armenian communities abroad against their countries.[67] Representatives’ references to the Turkishness,[68] being the children of Ataturk, and solidarity with their Muslim brethren[69] further consolidated symbolic significance of such acts. Additionally, the support of Armenian Patriarch[70] to such meetings further added a symbolic significance to such counteractions at institutional level among the Turkish Armenian community.

At discursive level, the members of Turkish Armenian community developed a common public discourse based on distancing from the discourse of hostility towards Turkey initiated by Armenian Diasporic formation. Consisting of a strong sentiments of protest against the political acts of diaspora this discourse seemed to put forward that Turkish Armenians were deprived of these activities which also claimed to represent the feelings and thoughts of Turkish Armenian community. At discursive level, the members of Turkish Armenian community who were interviewed by Turkish press in the eve and afterwards of the events, made a clear-cut separation between the Turkish Armenians and the others. While doing this separation they put emphasis either on their distinctiveness on the basis of Turkish citizenship or their Turkishness. Thus since the 1965 events mainly targeted Turkey and since Turkish Armenians were integral part of this country they could not be associated with the ones who attacked Turkey on behalf of a diasporic formation. They argue that the organizers of such events did not have any rights to represent the Turkish Armenian community, whose members had been living in peace with the other segments of Turkish society on these lands.[71]

At institutional level, Turkish Armenian Patriarchy released a statement before the events took place at 10 April 1965 which protesting the provocations of Armenians abroad against Turkey. According to the declaration released by the Patriarchy, it was the right and duty of all people to commemorate their departed people. Nevertheless these ceremonies of respect should not cause or facilitate hostilities in the hearts of nations. In this respect, Patriarchy argued that, members of Turkish Armenian community who lived in the Republican Turkey and who were grown up under the guidance of Ataturk’s principles had always proven that they were sincere, constructive and loyal citizens [of Turkey]. The Patriarchy added that Turkish Armenians were happy to see the permanency of feelings of brotherhood and trust. In this respect, Patriarchy presented its belief that some of the religious brethren of Turkish Armenians who were settled in foreign countries did not have the right to shadow the bounds of love and respect. In this respect, Patriarchy, the highest representative of Turkish Armenians at institutional level was declaring that Turkish Armenians would not accept any act against the interest of Turkey.[72]

Overall, putting emphasis on the destructive nature of the campaigns, which were launched by the Armenian diaspora against Turkey Turkish Armenians condemned such activities at symbolic, discursive and institutional levels. Evaluating the developments in an international context, they attracted the attention to the connections between these events and the political issues in international arena and thus underlined the role of international actors in provoking the Armenian diaspora in order to reach their strategic and political interests in international arena. Looking at the issue from national point of view, on the other hand, they mainly criticized the hatred speech and hostilities, which were raised by the Armenian diaspora, which they believed would exacerbate the relations between Turkish and Armenian nations rather than creating pressure on Turkey for any kind of concession. In this respect, they were anxious about the danger of feeding the feelings of hatred against Turkey, which could lead devastating implications in the inter-communal relationship. With a future oriented understanding their concern was to improve the relationship with Turkey and putting emphasis on the more positive components of Armenianness while constructing a common identity rather than establishing a political culture of struggle and discourse of hatred which would exceed the borders of a process of identity formation and would become a dangerous end in itself expressed in militant activism.

CONCLUSION

As elaborated in this article, different point of view in evaluate the significance of 1965 events in different contexts and by stressing on different aspects of their implications within these contexts.

From diasporic Armenian point of view, 1965 events were significant as initial steps of diasporic politics, which would serve emergence and consolidation of Armenian diasporic identity. From Turkish Armenian point of view these events were nothing more than provocation and manipulation of Armenian communities by the foreign actors, particularly Soviet Russia, Greek Cypriots and the Greeks against Turkey in order to back their cases in regional and international politics.

Both point of views seem to have strengths and weaknesses in understanding and reflecting the significance of 1965 events. Looking from the diasporic Armenian point of view, it may be argued that 1965 events were important as initial steps towards incorporating Armenian communities around the world into a form of diaspora politics. In that respect, the commemoration activities are supposed to play a role in the process of politicization of isolated Armenian communities around the idea of unification for common political interests, which would be a crucial stage in diasporic identity formation. Although it may be easy, from Armenian diasporic point of view, to conclude that the events of 1965 automatically facilitated Armenian diaspora identity formation; a taken for granted connection between 1965 political activities and diaspora identity formation can not simply explain either the evolution of Armenian diasporic identity or diaspora politics. In fact, content of the 1965 events also provides with the hints on the indecisiveness and diversity of Armenian diasporic groups in their strategies vis-à-vis Republican Turkey and its institutions within the context of political culture of struggle at the beginning. In this respect, rather than overemphasizing the importance of these events within the context of diaspora politics for propaganda purposes; their significance in Armenian diasporic transformation should be analyzed through comprehensive studies on the connections of these events to the international, regional and national contexts.

Another point, which is missed in the arguments of Armenian diasporic perspective, is the lack of in-depth analysis regarding the nature and limits of  politicization of diasporic identity and its probable implications on the inter-communal relations. As reducing political culture of diaspora politics simply to political culture of struggle and hatred against a common enemy would not serve to solve inter-communal problems, it may well result in deepening the hostilities, eradication of inter-communal communication channels and thus exacerbation of the relations.  In this respect although it may provide necessary political means and discursive grounds for mobilizing the masses at the initial stage of diasporic identity formation process, such a reductionist attitude carries the danger of being transformed into the main and even only determinant of identity at the further stages. In fact, the experience of the newly emerging Armenian diasporic establishment which lost the track of hatred discourse and paved the way for its expressions in terrorist activism in 1970s following the heightening the politicization  of hatred and hostilities after the spring of 1965, was a good example of such a transformation. Besides, significance of 1965 for Armenian diaspora politics (which is repeatedly mentioned especially by scholars of Armenian diaspora) was shadowed due to the fact that the political mobilization, which was supposed to be utilized after these events could not be kept within the track of politics. Thus the hatred culture and culture of struggle which was initially used as a mean to an end in mobilizing the masses and fueling political activism in diaspora politics soon became an end in itself and transformed into a diaspora militancy that would have destructive and traumatic implications in Turco-Armenian inter-communal relations.

Looking from the Turkish Armenian point of view on the other hand, (be it a pragmatic or a sincere discourse), it may be argued that Armenian communities were manipulated by the foreign actors in achieving their political and strategic interests in international and regional politics. In fact, considering the relations between Armenian diaspora and Greek, Greek Cypriot and Soviet Armenian administrations these arguments are remarkable in understanding and reflecting the nature and probable implications of 1965 events within regional and international contexts. Nevertheless, reducing the significance of 1965 events simply to provocations of hostile administrations may bring about underestimation of the implications of these events in the contexts of Armenian diasporic identity formation and diaspora politics.

A comprehensive analysis of significance of 1965 events can be done only by escaping from the weaknesses of these two clashing views and benefiting from the hints they might provide about the various aspects of Turco-Armenian inter-communal relations. Avoiding the reductionist approaches it may be possible to utilize these empirical hints in a broader national, international and transnational contexts and thus to provide with a more comprehensive understanding about the nature of Turco-Armenian relations in general and Turkish-Armenian Diaspora relations in particular.  In such a way it may well be possible to develop necessary discursive grounds not only to understand the significance of some events in Turco-Armenian relations in a broader context but also to provide a discursive change from the springs of hatred to the springs of hope.