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Articles

A 'TOUGH BUT SWEET' VISIT

Ali ASLAN, Assist. Prof. Dr.
19 February 2007 - Today's Zaman
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!áH€ ="justify">Turkish military Chief of Staff Gen. Yasar Büyükan?t, breezed his way through Washington this past week. In general, the winds that blew with Büyükan?t's visit were both sweet and tough. Thanks to the accreditation policies in place with regards to Zaman, we were partly hit, but never mind. I really do think that in the final analysis, the words that best describe Büyükan?t Pasha's style and latest state of Turkish-American relations are both "tough" and "sweet."

Let's begin by touching on the symbolic value of this visit. Washington, in having hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül one week in advance of Büyükan?t's visit, attempted to respect the balance between civilian and military power in the Turkish government. The basic symbolic message issued through US Vice President Dick Cheney’s reception of both men was: "We do not prefer military to civilians, nor civilians to military."

When it comes to the symbolic values which the pasha wanted to load onto his visit, first and foremost, by wearing civilian clothing to the public events during his time in Washington, and by taking great care with his words, he made a clear effort not to appear to be delivering a hard face towards the democratically elected government. This does not, however, mean that he neglected to deliver a few "gems of wisdom" while on this visit.

There was a small but noisy Washington-based group consisted of the usual suspects who provoked the pashas towards the February 28 military intervention in Turkey present at the Turkish Embassy during the reception held for Büyükan?t there. Their cries of "We have domestic problems pasha," or "Save us pasha," or even "We are not afraid pasha" rang out at the Embassy, but Büyükan?t pasha stayed faithful to his pre-planned points, and said nothing which could be interpreted as a message straight to the administration in Ankara. For example, while talking about threats faced by Turkey, he never once used that key phrase "irtica," (religious reactionaryism.) He later explained the risky phrase "dynamic forces" as meaning "everyone working for the longevity of the Turkish Republic." As a matter of fact, it would not have been fitting for the pasha to issue a message regarding Turkey's domestic situation while in a foreign country. Especially during a period when the commitment of Turkish Armed Forces to democracy is under so much scrutiny, in both America and the rest of the world…

Büyükan?t also avoided using any expressions in his speech which had the potential to hurt his American military or civilian counterparts. While making it clear that he did not embrace the talk of threatening speech in regards to the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution, Büyükan?t made reference to the intimations some in Ankara have made that US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could be in danger due to passage of the resolution. In general, the messages relayed by Büyükan?t to the Americans, whether over the Armenian resolution or the PKK, were of the type: "We will be hurt if we don't get the support we desire".

I wish that some of our political leaders, when making public statements about highly sensitive countries like the US and Israel, could use more diplomatic language. This applies in particular to expressions that might make the Jewish lobbies uncomfortable, especially at a time when we are working to make sure they help us prevent the Armenian resolution, a resolution which has the potential to damage not only Turkey but Erdogan administration.

I am doubtful that Büyükan?t pasha had much success in convincing Washington, an administration which when it comes to the PKK is full of sweet talk, but when the topic turns to concrete action in North Iraq, stands rocklike and impassive in the face of Ankara's desires. A well-placed American friend of mine noted: "It's better not to expect anything dramatic from the US, like what happened before with the turning over of Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey. If anything at all happens in North Iraq, it might involve some action in the Mahmur camp. The struggle against the PKK will be gradual." There is still no green light from Washington in regards to a wide-ranging operation against the PKK.

Perhaps the pasha's most potentially hurtful move while in the US was the one which could put the diplomatic bargaining plans also advised by Washington between Ankara and the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders into trouble. To be fair, the Pasha did not go as far as saying "Administration should not meet with the Kurdish leaders." But he did say as soldiers, they don’t have anything to talk with them. But the portrayal of Barzani's and Talabani's political parties as being some of the main supporters of the PKK - and this is not necessarily untrue - may well wind up dealing a blow to public support for this sort of diplomatic venture. His remarks pointing out that military is only responsible for dealing with the warfare aspect of the terror problem, and that there were also the sociological, economic, psychological and other aspects to be dealt by other divisions of the state was quite well-placed.

I have learned that in his closed talks at the National Defense University and the Washington Institute, Büyükan?t largely touched on the topic of the PKK, and that he didn't say anything too different from what he said in public. At one point, he reportedly said: "In Turkey, we are busy cutting off the tail of the snake, but the head remains in place in North Iraq." I am quite sure Americans did find Büyükan?t a little tough vis-à-vis overall resolution of the Kurdish question.

There are of course certain issues which everyone agrees not to declare to the public on visits like these. For example, I would be very surprised if it turned out that Büyükan?t and Cheney had not discussed Iran during their meetings.

In the end, Büyükan?t's visit to the US was in fact helpful. He solidified and clarified most of the messages already extended to the US on Iraq, the PKK, and the Armenian genocide resolution. Of course, if there were better coordination between the various wings of the state, better results could have been achieved. In Washington, the contributions by both Gül and Büyükan?t to Turkish-American relations have general been found positive by most circles. While the US administration sees Erdogan's stance volatile, and Sezer's as much tougher, Ankara's overall position these days looks "tough but sweet."

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