!âmà  face="Verdana" size="2">There are those who point out that we have not managed to solve the Armenian issue and portray this as a failure in our foreign policy. The same argument has also been made regarding Cyprus. In fact, some other issues, too, can be cited in this context: our Iraq policy, our relations with the United States, the EU membership process and the Aegean problems.

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  There are those who point out that we have not managed to solve the Armenian issue and portray this as a failure in our foreign policy. The same argument has also been made regarding Cyprus. In fact, some other issues, too, can be cited in this context: our Iraq policy, our relations with the United States, the European Union membership process and the Aegean problems.

  It is true that our foreign policy's problem-solving capacity is not high. However, it must not be forgotten that Turkey, in general, has not been successful when it comes to problem solving. Have we not been one of the last countries to lower the inflation rate? Don't problems continue to exist in such areas as land development, traffic and taxation?

  Obviously the fact that we switched to a democratic system at a relatively early date has played a certain role in the way these issues have turned into problems and remained unsolved. Political parties have preferred not to tackle the kind of problems that cannot be solved without upsetting the masses, which are already faced with great difficulties. They have been afraid they would lose the elections to their rivals. In the end, almost all segments of society have embraced, more or less, a certain unlawfulness as a way of life. Problems have become chronic.

  A succession of governments that have had no problem-solving experience in the realm of domestic politics have behaved, when faced with problems in the foreign relations area, as if they expected these problems to disappear automatically in time. Furthermore, foreign policy is an area where, inherently, there are some extra difficulties. Since each foreign-relations problem is a conflict that involves a minimum of two parties, their resolution does not depend on us alone. Our rivals struggle to death to ensure that these conflicts will not be resolved in our favor. They do not accept a compromise until they use up their strength and, as a result, conflicts last longer than a person's lifespan.

  Political conflicts are “zero result” games. In other words, one's gain is another's loss. “Win-win” solutions are hardly possible. Look, for example, at the crisis that recently broke out between China and its biggest trade partner and foreign investor Japan. When the Japanese textbooks failed to reflect Japanese abuse of the Chinese during the war, that triggered an unprecedented tension in bilateral relations.

  The Taiwan case is another example. The Taiwanese too have made large-scale investments in mainland China. However, Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and openly says that it would attack Taiwan if the latter opted for independence -- at the risk of confrontation with the United States, who is China's second-biggest economic partner. In other words, economic interests cannot prevent political conflicts. This may be distressing, but it is a fact that in the realm of foreign policy politics supersedes economic considerations.

  It is all the more difficult for a country that has multiple problems to protect its interests when it has a conflict with a country that has a single problem. While Turkey grapples with many strategic problems, the Greek Cypriots' sole goal seems to be swallowing up the northern part of the island and the Armenians are making a single-minded effort to make us “admit the genocide.”

  Undeniably, our biggest weakness in the realm of foreign policy stems from our own behavior. Not counting the 1974 intervention in Cyprus and the 1998 crisis with Syria, Turkish foreign policy has mainly been defensive over the past 50 years. Turkey has underestimated its own strength while blowing out of proportion the might of those confronting it. It has failed to see that nothing can be done in the realm of foreign policy without taking risks. It has considered it disgraceful to try to explain itself to the world. It has found it hard to ask for help from others.

  Meanwhile, there are two other major obstacles as well on the path of Turkish foreign policy. These two factors are interlinked. In the wake of World War II, Turkey took its place in the Western world, but the Western countries, finding it hard to overcome their prejudices rooted in history, still do not consider Turkey to be “one of them.” This has become clearer in the post-Cold War era, especially during Turkey's EU membership process. Would the Armenian issue have reached today's proportions if the West had acted fairly?

  Meanwhile, many “liberal intellectuals” who have newspaper columns in Turkey (though, in some other countries they would be deemed marginal) argue that in order to be “Western” Turkey should meet each and every demand of the West. Westerners exploit these intellectuals' “lack of identity” in the realm of foreign policy. Therefore, obviously we will not be able to conduct “volume” or “public opinion” diplomacy on the Armenian issue just as we could not do that on the Cyprus issue.

  For too long Turkey has had too few academics interested in foreign policy problems. We still do not have a sufficient number of jurists and historians specializing in genocide, terrorism and the law of war. Our legal experts and historians prefer to build a career in more positive aspects of life.

  Also, as a nation we want prompt resolution of conflicts. We cannot harbor hostile feelings towards anybody for long. We support those that favor a quick solution. We forget that compared to foreign policy, even a marathon is a “speed race.” And the only way to resolve conflicts “quickly” is to make too many concessions.