!ßõ�  ="justify">The Turks on July 22 did not only re-elect the AKP, give it a carte blanche for a new term and indirectly elected Abdullah Gül as president, but they also indirectly endorsed the Armenian genocide resolution.

ƒ$sp; There are probably too many of them, but the Sept. 7 article, “Judgment time: Should America recognize an Armenian genocide?” written by Barabara Lerner forcefully reminds us of some of the most recent “great Turkish myths” – and probably the most repulsive.  

  After a too-hard-to-deny argument on why the Nazi Holocaust was different from the Ottoman killings of Armenians, Ms. Lerner cautions that what she brands as a “radical realignment” (i.e., an American stamp of approval on the alleged Armenian genocide) could irreparably damage U.S.-Turkish ties:

  ''There are times when we should give moral considerations precedence over prudential ones, but there is never a time when we should do so blindly, without estimating the cost and deciding if we are honestly willing to pay it. The risk here is that endorsing the genocide resolution will turn what is already a growing rift between America and Turkey, into a historic parting of the ways between our two nations.” 

Are the Turks really frustrated?

  Ms. Lerner also argues that Turks are: (a) angry that America's Kurdish allies in Iraq refuse to restrain the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and sometimes even threaten to unleash further PKK violence if Turkey balks at Kurdish government demands, (b) angry and hurt that America refuses to seriously pressure the Kurds, even when the weapons the PKK uses to kill Turks are American weapons, (c) angry and frustrated that American diplomats repeatedly warn the Turkish military against taking any cross-border military action to put an end to the aggression themselves; and finally, (d) equally dismayed by the growing western attempt to brand Turkey as a genocidal nation.  

  Sensible words, no doubt. But are the Turks really angry, hurt, frustrated and dismayed over the reasons Ms. Lerner realistically lists? That is a contemporary Turkish myth.  

  Now, let's have a small Question and Answer session: Can Nancy Pelosi bring the Armenian genocide resolution to a floor vote any day now, although America is increasingly engaged in Iraq? Yes. How long have the Turks known of the danger of the U.S. resolution? Several months. When the danger appeared this vividly for the first time in Turkish (and Turkish-American) history, who was in charge of Turkish diplomacy? Then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. With whom is Mr. Gül said to have excellent relations? America. Who did the Turks want to become their new president? Mr. Gül. For whom there have been loud cheers and celebrations of all sorts and bonfires all around Turkey? Mr. Gül. Whom do the Turks love so passionately? The man who was in charge of Turkish diplomacy when the genocide resolution was taking shape in Washington, D.C.  

  The bitter truth is that, the Turks on July 22 did not only re-elect the Justice and Development Party (AKP), give it carte blanche for a new term and indirectly elect Mr. Gül as president, they also indirectly endorsed the Armenian genocide resolution.  

Remember frustration over France:  

  The Turks, like their government, are pragmatists rather than anti-this or pro-that. Does anyone have any idea of what happened to the grand Turkish boycott, governmental and popular, in retaliation to the French bill that recognized the Armenian genocide in 2001, and another one that criminalized the denial of the genocide in 2006?  

  The governmental boycott? French companies have won the contracts they would otherwise have won and are bidding for others too, including military deals.

  The popular boycott? In the first seven months of 2007, France was Turkey's fourth biggest export market and fifth biggest exporter to Turkey.  

  Another myth is the anti-Americanism in Turkey that various opinion polls have revealed is the highest in the world (81 percent, according to a most recent study). Yet 46.6 percent of Turks voted for what is known to be the most U.S.-friendly political grouping in the country. For example, Turks would likely oppose (if asked by pollsters) Turkey allying with America against Iran, but they would probably vote their government back in even if it allied with America against Iran. Eight in every 10 Turks say they disapprove of America and/or American policies, but almost one in every two Turks voted for a man whose chief foreign policy advisor once asked Washington bigwigs to “use this man instead of putting him to the drain.”  

  It is true that the Turks are angry with the PKK's violence. But there are other facts too. Like, for example, 46.6 percent of them voted for the party that on July 22 was as popular among Kurdish voters as were the Kurdish independents (the southeast vote was split half-half between the AKP and the Kurdish independents).  

  Why did the Turks vote for a party that was also the most popular non-Kurdish party for the Kurds? Why did Kurdish voters either vote for independents, which meticulously refrain from branding the PKK as a terrorist organization, or the AKP? Again, July 22 was an indirect and practical public endorsement of the AKP's “Kurdish policies,” including the PKK.  

  It's bizarre: Most Turks dislike Jalal Talabani, Iraq's Kurdish leader, but they voted for the party which Mr. Talabani explicitly safeguarded in a public speech in which he asked the Kurds “not to cause trouble for the government in the run-up to the polls.”  

 

The 4 percent ‘boom?'

  Another myth that has been widely portrayed as a fact especially since 2003 is “the rising Turkish nationalism.” Well, at least the election results indicate that it was a myth.  

  Let's assume that the Republican People's Party (CHP) actually falls into the “nationalist zone” on the political spectrum despite its self-declared social democrat tag. On July 22 this party won almost what it won in 2002 (and this despite support from other “leftist” parties this time). Two other parties, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Young Party (GP), which subscribed to a fierce nationalist rhetoric, won a combined 15 percent in 2002 and 17 percent in 2007. So, the combined “nationalist” vote rose to 38 percent in 2007 from 34 percent five years earlier. Can we safely brand a 4 percentage point rise in any vote as a “boom?”  

  All these great Turkish myths remind me of an unfortunate corporate story.  

  A few years earlier an international condom maker which decided to make an entrée into the lucrative Turkish market conducted a survey to see what size stocks it should pile up for its opening sales campaign in Turkey. Relying on the survey results based on interviews, the company loaded its dealers almost exclusively with XL products. The stocks never sold.

  Rumor has it that the Turks are increasingly frustrated over being branded by the West as a genocidal nation, that they are the world's most anti-American nation, that Turkish nationalism has been dangerously booming to new heights, that the Turks are dismayed by Kurdish separatist violence and its supporters in and outside of Turkey. Rumor also has it that the most common condom size for the Turks is XL.