.E°`="justify">Once Soviet Union disintegrated, Azerbaijan appeared on the political map of the world as an independent republic. However, it was rather an unfamiliar partner for the U.S., lost among the many recently originated actors on the political scene.

BKlitical scene. The U.S. regarded the newly established independent republics as a buffer zone around Russia, Soviet Union’s successor state. Washington’s policy in this period aimed at merely keeping the region free from great power domination.

The principle mission was to weaken the retaining Russian influence and prevent the stark dependence of the newly established states on Russia in spheres of trade and security.

The U.S. interests were rather abstract and uncertain. The initial step establishing diplomatic ties was opening the U.S. embassy in Baku in March 1992. The same year United States launched its major program “Freedom Support Act”, which was to provide the newly established Eurasian states the assistance for humanitarian needs, democratization, creation of market economies, trade and investment, and other purposes.

Azerbaijan had a weaker position in comparison to other countries of the region, particularly its adversary in the territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, whose interests were zealously lobbied in the Congress by the well-established American-Armenian Diaspora. In this regard, the Helsinki Human Rights Watch Report stated, The United States had two Karabagh policies: one originating on the Capitol Hill, the other in the White House. While the State Department attempted to play the role of an honest broker in the conflict, condemning displacement of civilians and human right abuses by both sides, Congress adopted a decidedly pro-Armenian position[1].

As a major success of Armenian lobbying activities Section 907 was put through in the Congress. According to this section the most U.S. government-to-government aid to Azerbaijan was prohibited until Azerbaijan “ceases blockades and other offensive use of force against Armenia”, except for non-proliferation and disarmament activities. Azerbaijan’s efforts to repeal the Section 907, which, apparently “hit the wrong target”[2], were fruitless.
 
The Section 907 impeded the bilateral relation between Baku and Washington. Until 2001, this provision had been altered only to permit humanitarian and democratization aid, border security and customs support to promote non-proliferation, Trade and Development Agency aid, Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance, Export-Import Bank financing, and Foreign Commercial Service activities[3].

Pipeline Connecting States And Governments

Opposite to the U.S. government, American private oil companies revealed a greater interest about the oil sector of Azerbaijan, which tended to see the Newly Independent States as a Russian sphere of influence. However, the job of American potential oil investors to enter the Azerbaijani oil business was not easy considering the harsh competition with BP for exploitation of Caspian oil riches, and the lack of trust in Baku towards Washington amplified by the Section 907. Nevertheless, with Heydar Aliyev coming to power the situation changed. After long negotiations between Baku and Amoco, this U.S’ biggest investor in Azerbaijan’s oil sector got its share in the oil deal.

On September 20, 1994, Aliyev and consortium of major oil companies gathered in Baku for the ceremonial signing the exploration of Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil fields in Azerbaijan, which the Azerbaijani president called the "deal of the century". This confirmed the formal introduction of the American presence into the region. More than twenty so called Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) were signed in the following years.[4]

Such an active cooperation between Azerbaijani government and American business sector intensified the interest of Washington. The U.S. foreign policy towards the region was markedly shaped by the energy interests. Besides, such influential companies as Amoco have had their voice in the Congress holding a leverage of financial donations to the parties.

The year 1997 is considered a turning point in the U.S’ strategic interests when the United States Government with the help of American oil companies realized the geostrategic importance of the Caspian Sea basin and initiated a special strategy regarding the region.

Under the pressure of Amoco, President Clinton invited President Aliyev to Washington in August 1997, where a new Amoco oil exploration deal was signed. In addition Clinton promised to lobby Congress to lift U.S. economic sanctions on Azerbaijan.[5] Furthermore, Azerbaijan was talked into developing multiple pipeline routes from Caspian, and that’s when the United States launched a campaign stressing the strategic importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route as part of “Eurasian Transport Corridor.” Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum projects were also set on track at that time.

Parallel to this the obsolete pipeline crossing Russia was planned to be repaired and renewed, which presumably would keep Russia less vocal in her protests against the major BTC project.

Bill Clinton and Heydar Aliyev signed a joint political statement in Washington, and this visit was a major milestone in the bilateral relations of the two countries. Consequently, in 1999 at the Istanbul summit of OSCE Clinton signed a common declaration with the presidents of Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan on Caspian energy development and transit.

As a U.S. state oil executive aptly remarked "Since the U.S. government was slow to pick up on the importance of the region, [the three Caspian states] forged relations with U.S. business.[6] "By investing two billion into the three new Caspian oil riparian states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, U.S. helped revive collapsed economies at the same time securing its political and strategic gains.

This all took the U.S.-Azerbaijani relations to a qualitatively new level. Although, marked by United States’ pure pragmatic interests this new cooperation was highly beneficial for both parties as the U.S. in their turn were supposed to shore up the financial and political independence of a young country. At the same time American oil companies became advocates in Washington for the governments of Caspian states, calling attention to natural resources and significance of Caspian, supporting Caspian political causes and putting the region on the agenda of Washington's policy debates, advocated waiving of the Section 907.

9/11 – Turning Point In The Us-Azerbaijan Relations

The situation radically changed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The role of partner states in Central Asia and Caucasus were fundamentally revised. Energy interests, though still strong, were no more the primary in the U.S. policy regarding Azerbaijan and gave in to the security interests. The two countries were now bound by mutual devotion to the global war against common evil. Azerbaijan had a special stand as an American-friendly Muslim state with crucial geographical location.

In the aftermath of 9/11 by virtue of its location amid Russia, Iran and Turkey and its proximity to Iraq, South Caucasus and Azerbaijan in particular significantly gained importance. U.S. turned to the countries calling for support in the global war against terrorism. Azerbaijan in its turn pledged to provide any assistance needed in the counter-terrorism war declared by the U.S. To back up its pledges with real deeds Azerbaijan supported the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, granted the U.S. the overflight rights and contributed troops to Afghanistan[7]. Azerbaijan also backed the United States-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), offering the use of its airbases and to participate in the stabilization force[8] and in re-building Iraq.

Azerbaijan’s ready-to-help conduct has had immediate repercussions and was followed by the application of the presidential waiver right on the Section 907 on the annual basis. As a result Azerbaijan has been receiving substantial military and other support from the U.S., even though the amounts are incomparable to the help provided to the neighboring countries arguably due to the problems with fitting the democratic standards. While democracy concerns restraint the U.S.-Azerbaijani relations from being more cordial, Baku still has the potential to be an important strategic partner.

Nato’s American Accent

The materialization of USA’s presence in the region is NATO, which today primarily reflects policy and strategic interests of the United States.

Caucasus has been turned into an exercise ground for the contemporary Cold War practices. NATO is striving for the domination in the territories surrounding Russia, irritating the Big Bear by its constant patrol on its borders and continuing approaching. However, the countries cannot risk vexing Russia by its direct accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was established as a bridge between those members and non-members of NATO. PfP and Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is a good compromise and a pacifier for Russia and other regional powers, which makes the South Caucasian states not a member of NATO yet not outsiders either.

Azerbaijan joined PfP in 1994, the next year after its launching. Among other functions, the PfP program was designed to improve practical military cooperation and enable joint operations with NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.  On a practical level this means ongoing U.S. military training programs in the region under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and the Foreign Military Financing program, and border security activities. Once again, the PfP creates a false feeling of security of non-expansion of NATO to the CIS states. In reality PfP program is a practical realization of these goals.  In 1996 Azerbaijan commenced on the NATO Planning and Review Program (PARP).

Baku claims it plans to complete the implementation of the IPAP signed in 2005 ‘very soon’ but never specifies the dates[9].

At the same time Baku expresses its concerns about the deliverability of the NATO, speculating on the ongoing crises inside of the organizations. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Araz Azimov in his speech opined that “NATO is a political union of countries, but at the same time is an institution with growing challenges caused by geographical enlargement and its consequences”, and thus Azerbaijan cannot risk relying on this organization.

Having the status of a partner, not a member, does not exclude the direct cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO; the equipment, funding and expertise provided within the framework of Active Partnership enhance the deliverability of the country’s armed forces. Azerbaijan avoids public statements about is NATO membership aspirations emphasizing that the ultimate goal is not a membership but the process of reaching the standards. Thus expanding its existing partnership with NATO is the priority for Azerbaijan. The country prefers to benefit from the ongoing direct bilateral military cooperation with both Turkey and the United States, without incurring the risk of alienating its immediate neighbors Russia and Iran by the formal expression of intent to join NATO.

Conclusion: Revised Interests

Concluding the integrate elements that shape the U.S. interests in Azerbaijan as well as the role of Azerbaijan in the world’s politics in general consist of the following components – geostrategic location, historical and cultural peculiarity (i.e. secular Turkic Shi’a Muslim energy rich Western-oriented post-Soviet State in the geostrategically crucial Caucasus) and last but not least, energy security. These elements in their turn are multilayered and include further components, where international security in the region and beyond, namely U.S.’ main offshore military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as growing concerns about Iran must be considered. The South Caucasus is seen as an air corridor, a "lifeline" between the coalition forces in Afghanistan and bases in Europe. Another objective is promotion of the regional security as well as apparent tilt to achieving regional military domination.

Further components of the U.S.’ strategic interests are energy security and diversification of supply outside of the Persian Gulf and a breaking of Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by encouraging the building of trans-Caspian pipelines, by that connecting Central Asian region to the Caucasus and via Caucasus to Europe, and bypassing Russia, and thus promoting energy security of the West through diversified suppliers.

Therefore, the role of Azerbaijan is not confined to that of a mere energy supplier but is transformed into the role of a transportation hub and transit point of energy supplies. Taken all this, Azerbaijan is arguably more important than its Caucasian neighbors Georgia and Armenia, sharing borders with Russia, Iran, and Turkey and, via the Caspian Sea, Central Asia. As Cornell opines, Azerbaijan is the only truly irreplaceable country in the East-West corridor linking Europe and Turkey to Central Asia.[10]
Furthermore, cultural, historical and ethnic ties and geographical proximity of Azerbaijan to the neighboring Iran are among important factors. The potential role of Azerbaijan in the diplomatic triangle of Russia, Iran and the West is gaining more concern. Azerbaijan’s role is perceived as crucial in assisting the United States contain the Iranian influence in the Caucasus. Nevertheless Azerbaijan is reluctant to the pick up on the U.S. anti-Iran initiatives, not willing to incur aggravation of the fragile diplomatic relations between the two countries that have so much to share and too much to lose in case of worsening of the relations.

Azerbaijan is getting more vocal about its discontent with U.S. foreign policy. As opined before, Azerbaijan restrains itself from declaring its loyalty to NATO but prefers the status of a partner. Consequently, NATO repeatedly expressed its concerns about the reluctance of Azerbaijan's leaders to state unequivocally that they either wish to join the alliance (as neighboring Georgia has done), or that they have no intention of doing so (as Armenia has done)[11].

 

At the same time, many analysts argue that Azerbaijan could be at the top of the U.S. government's interest list, “As a pro-American, secular Shi‘ite state with strained ties with Iran and good relations with both, Israel and Turkey, Azerbaijan remains a major strategic asset for Washington”[12].

 

All in all, at the expense of its oil success and crucial geopolitical location Azerbaijan feels much more confident and presumes it can afford being independent in its foreign policy. Baku dears not picking up on the undertakings of the United States, but rather gives it a second thought. Azerbaijan maintains its own line of conduct, putting its individual interests higher that partnership and alliance with any country.

Leyla Shamchiyeva

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[1] “Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh”, Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki. 1994, USA. P. 78.

[2] Vladimir Socor “Azerbaijan's President In Washington (Part 2)”, May 3 2006, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371043

[3] Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests by Jim Nichol. CRS Report for Congress. Updated November 16, 2006

[4] Azerbaijan’s Tough Foreign Policy Choices. Fariz Ismailzade, UNISCI Discussion Paper, October 2004, http://www.ucm.es/info/unisci/Fariz.pdf

[5] Azerbaijan's Riches Alter the Chessboard. By Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway. Washington Post Staff Writers, Sunday, October 4, 1998; Page A1. Online available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/europe/caspian100498.htm

[6] Ibid.

[7] 23 troops were deployed in early 2006 (see CRS Report for Congress. Updated November 16, 2006)

[8] In 2003 Azerbaijan dispatched 150 troops to Iraq